Educology

What follows is a recurring editorial in the form of a narrative outline as an introductory account of the format of the Compact Disk formatted International Journal of Educology (cd-IJE), as a journal published through the Institute of History and Philosophy of Educology for Developing Democracies in the World an initiative of Educology Research Associates/USA (ERA/USA).

The content of cd-IJE is formatted differently, since 2005. The new format recognizes the existence of the newly forming body of knowledge, i.e. philosophy of educology, as knowledge about educology, and the existence of a developed and developing body of knowledge, i.e. educology, as knowledge about educational processes in which organically inhere features of educative experiences.

The editorial has been put into narrative outline style, with the intent of providing, as well and short as possible, at this stage, a precise and concise account of these two developing bodies of knowledge in their interrelationship to each other and other developing bodies of knowledge. The editorial is planned for recurrence and revision in future issues of the Journal, from the 2005 issue on, with no terminal date set, at this time. Comments critiquing the Recurring Editorial are solicited by the operational and contributing editors. Such comments will be included in revisions of the editorial, in respect to its change for improvement.

Issues of cd-IJE, since 2005, then, have recognized the existence of philosophy of educology and published articles in it that have been written from various perspectives, including, but not limited to, the three perspectives (analytical, experiential, and phenomenological perspectives) accounted for in the outline, as the Journal has published articles in educology from various perspectives in the past.

The International Journal of Educology (the Journal) is a refereed journal (ISSN 0818-0563) that is published biannually (January and July) by Educology Research Associates/USA (ERA/USA), through its initiative of the Institute of History and Philosophy of Educology for Developing Democracies in the World (the Institute). Periodically, special issues of the Journal are published.

When distinguishing between a word, the meaning of a word, and the reference of the meaning of a word, the meaning of the word ‘educology’ refers to a fund of knowledge claims, i.e. the fund of knowledge claims about educational processes as processes in which organically inhere a logic, psychology, problematics, and methodology of educative experiences, The word ‘educology’ derives from the words ‘education’ and ‘logy’.

‘Educology’ has been in use, in the USA, since the seminal work by the late Professor Lowery W. Harding at Ohio State University in the 1950’s. Following this seminal work was that of Professors Emeritus Elizabeth Steiner (Maccia) and George Maccia at Indiana University in the 1960’s in the USA, and, James F. Christensen and James E. Fisher from the 1970’s to the present in Australia and the USA, mostly through Educology Research Associates in Australia and the USA.

In Europe, in 1978, Professor Wolfgang Brezinka at Konstanz University, Konstanz, Germany and, in 1978-79, Professor Anon Monshouwer at the Institute of Philosophy and History of Education, Nijmegen, The Netherlands, did pioneering work in philosophy of educology. Also, in Europe pioneering work in philosophy of educology has been done by Professor Leonas Javaisa, recently retired from Vilnius University, and is being done by Professor Kestutis Pukelis at Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas, Lithuania and Professor Lilija Duobliene at Vilnius University, Vilnius, Lithuania, since 1991 in Lithuania, both of whom have published in cd-IJE. In the fifty plus years since the seminal work of Professor Harding, with the meaning of the word ‘educology’ used to refer to a body of knowledge about educational processes, there has been, from the perspective of the Institute, a central challenge in philosophy of educology.

The challenge is the philosophical challenge of clarifying the nature of educological knowledge, i.e. clarifying the nature of educology, and its subject matter of educational processes, by critiquing experiences that are conducted in the areas of interest of logic, psychology, problematics, and methodology as disciplines that conditionally organize the features of reflective thinking experiences, whereby, these experiences: (1) organically inhere in knowing processes; (2) are engaged for the purpose of producing knowledge about education and a society of reflectively experienced educologists, and; (3) constitute a model for conditionally organizing the features of educative experiences; (i) that organically inhere in educational processes, and; (ii) that are engaged in developing democracies in the world for the purpose of producing a culture of educatively experienced citizens.

The account that follows and the Journal, itself, from the perspective of the Institute, are intended to be an introduction to work in philosophy of educology, hence, philosophy, aimed at meeting this challenge.

1. examine, from the perspective of educology, the subject matter that accounts for educational processes in which organically inhere features of educative experiences that are modeled after reflective thinking experiences organically inhering in knowing processes, and;

2. examine, from the perspective of philosophy of educology, the subject matter that accounts for various areas of interest in knowing processes that conditionally organize, i.e. that discipline, features of reflective thinking experiences that: (i) organically inhere in knowing processes, and; (ii) constitute a model for educative experiences organically inhering in educational processes.

Subject matter for educology, as the territory of educology, in general:

1. is subject matter that accounts for the various and complex aspects of educational processes, in which organically inhere features of educative experiences modeled after the features of reflective thinking experiences, and;

2. is subject matter that accounts for persons, including themselves;

2.1 in an organization of areas of interest that discipline features of educative experiences

2.2 of persons meeting, managing, and teaching themselves, and;

2.2.1. other persons who authentically (well) and in-authentically (ill) study,

2.2.2. for truly (well) and un-truly (ill) learning something,

2.3. in some situation.

The territory of educology, then, is that which is selectively emphasized and focused on, i.e. that is mapped, in and for educology:

1. featuring the aspects of educational processes in which organically inhere educative experiences, modeled after reflective thinking experiences organically inhering in knowing processes , and;

2. featuring synergetic effects in and on, and that which cause synergetic effects in and on, the aspects of educational processes, for example;

2.1. the governing factors, for example, of policy and curriculum development practices, and, supervisory and administrative practices as these factors have and do not have synergetic effects in and on educational processes in some situation, and;

2.2. the cultural factors, for example;

2.2.1. of forms of governments, economies, laws, habitus, and memes;

2.2.2. of forms of media and telecommunication networks;

2.2.3. of forms of sports and entertainment businesses;

2.2.4. of forms of industrialized science and technology business corporations, and;

2.2.5. of forms of information theory and knowledge societies;

as these factors have and do not have synergetic effects in and on educational processes in some situation and, by;

2.3. the ecosystem factors, for example;

2.3.1. of ecosystems, communities, and populations, and, of habitats and niches;

2.3.2. of bio-geo-chemical water, oxygen, and nitrogen eco-cycles, and;

2.3.3. of biotic and abiotic natural environments involving the trophic, i.e. nutritive,

pyramids of feeding levels, food chains, and food webs; as these factors have and do not have synergetic effects in and on educational processes in some situation.

As knowledge claims about the subject matter of the selectively emphasized and focused on complex of features, i.e. the mapped features, of situated educational processes, as features in which organically inhere educative experiences modeled after reflective thinking experiences organically inhering in knowing processes, educology is constituted by empirical knowledge claims, composed and asserted with warrant to meet:

1. the descriptive and predictive challenges established in producing, for example sociology, psychology, anthropology, and history as these funds of empirical knowledge claims are established in knowledge societies from the educological perspective:

1.1. not as the sociology of mapped features of educational processes, but as the educology of mapped features of social processes, producing sociologic educology;

1.2. not as psychology of mapped features of educational processes, but as educology of mapped features of psychical processes, producing psychologic educology;

1.3. not as anthropology of mapped features of educational processes, but as educology of mapped features of the cultural processes, producing anthropologic educology;

1.4. not as a history of mapped features of past educational processes, but as educology of mapped features of past processes, producing historic educology, and;

2. the predictive and prescriptive challenges established in producing economics, politicology. jurisprudence, praxiology as these funds of empirical knowledge claims are established in knowledge societies from the educological perspective:

2.1. not as economics of mapped features of educational processes, hut as educology of mapped features of economic processes, producing economic educology;

2.2. not as politicology of mapped features of educational processes, hut as educology of mapped features of political processes, producing politico educology;

2.3. not as jurisprudence of mapped features of educational processes, but as educology of mapped features of litigative and legislative processes, producing jurisprudential educology;

2.4. not as praxiology of mapped features of educational processes, but as educology of mapped features of the meeting, managing, teaching, studying, and learning processes, producing praxiologic educology.

Educology, then:

1. is a fund of empirical knowledge claims, that provide a perspective for producing warranted descriptive and predictive assertions about social, psychical, cultural, and historical processes, such that, then, educology divides into an:

1.1. educology of socially conducted human situated educational processes;

1.1.1. in which organically inhere educative experiences, modeled after reflective thinking experiences organically inhering in knowing processes, and;

1.1.2. about which is produced warranted assertions as to what is, and could be, the case in regard to these processes;

2.2. educology of psychically conducted human situated educational processes;

2.2.1. in which organically inhere educative experiences, modeled after reflective thinking experiences organically inhering in knowing processes, and;

2.2.2. about which is produced warranted assertions as to what is, and could be, the case in regard to this process;

2.3. educology of culturally conducted human situated process;

2.3.1. into in which organically inhere educative experiences, modeled after reflective thinking experiences organically inhering in knowing processes, and;

2.3.2. about which is produced warranted assertions as to what is, and could be, the case in regard to this process, and;

2.4. educology of past humanly conducted situated process;

2.4.1. into in which organically inhere educative experiences, modeled after reflective thinking experiences organically inhering in knowing processes, and;

2.4.2. about which warranted assertions as to what was, and could be, the case in regard

to this process, and;

2. is a fund of empirical knowledge claims that provide a perspective for producing warranted predictive and prescriptive assertions about economical, political, litgative and legislative, and meeting-managing-teachingstudying-learning regulated processes, such that, then, educology, further, divides into an:

2.1.educology of effective economically conducted human situated and regulated social processes;

2.1.1. into in which organically inhere educative experiences, modeled after reflective thinking experiences organically inhering in knowing processes, and;

2.1.2. about which is produced warranted assertions as to what could and ought to be the case in regard to these regulated social process;

2.2. educology of effective politically conducted human situated and regulated social process;

2.2.1 into in which organically inhere educative experiences, modeled after reflective thinking experiences organically inhering in knowing processes, and;

2.2.2. about which is produced warranted assertions as to what could and ought to be the case in regard to these regulated social processes;

2.3. educology of effective litigatively and legislatively conducted human situated and regulated social processes;

2.3.1 into in which organically inhere educative experiences, modeled after reflective thinking experiences organically inhering in knowing processes, and;

2.3.2. about which is produced warranted assertions as to what could and ought to be the case in regard to these regulated social process, and;

2.4. educology of an effective meeting-managing-teaching-studying-learning conducted humansituated and regulated process;

2.4.1. into in which organically inhere educative experiences, modeled after reflective thinking experiences organically inhering in knowing processes, and;

2.4.2. about which is produced warranted assertions as to what could and ought to be the case in regard to these regulated social process;

1. educology has a subject matter selectively emphasized and focused on, i.e. mapped, that accounts for features of situated educational processes in which organically inhere educative experiences, conducted well and ill by persons, modeled after reflective thinking experiences organically inhering in knowing processes, conducted well and ill by persons, and;

2. educology is a subject matter selectively emphasized and focused on, i.e. mapped, that accounts for features of the situated knowing processes in which organically inhere reflective thinking experiences, conducted well and ill by persons that serves as a model for educative experiences organically inhering in educational processes, conducted well and ill by persons.

Whereas, then, as a fund of empirical knowledge claims, educology has a subject matter, and, it, itself, is subject matter, and, it is subject matter that compares and contrasts with that which is subject matter for it.

From the perspective of educology “having subject matter,” the subject matter:

1. is that of educational processes in which organically inhere educative experiences, modeled after reflective thinking experiences organically inhering in knowing processes, and;

2. is the subject matter of empirical science.

From the perspective educology “being subject matter,” the subject matter:

1. is that of knowing processes in which organically inhere reflective thinking experiences, modeling educative experiences organically inhering in educational processes, and;

2. is the subject matter of empirical philosophy.

Each kind of subject matter, then, compares in that each kind selectively emphasizes and focuses on, i.e. in that each kind maps, conduct in situated processes, and, each kind of conduct, in these situated social processes, has a kind of experience organically inhering in it, whereby:

1. reflective thinking experiences organically inhere in the conduct of knowing processes and model educative experiences organically inhering in educational processes, and;

2. educative experiences organically inhere in the conduct of educational processes and model after reflective thinking experiences organically inhering in knowing processes.

Each kind of subject matter contrasts, however, in that:

1. educology has subject matter constituted by educational processes existing externally from itself, whereas;

2. educology, itself, is subject matter constituted by knowing processes existing internally to itself.

The subject matter of educology, as educology itself, then, is subject matter for empirically oriented philosophy, i.e. for empirical philosophy, but, not for empirically oriented science, i.e. not for empirical science. Educology, as subject matter selectively emphasized and focused upon, i.e. educology, as mapped subject matter, is that of a logically formed pattern of features of reflective thinking experiences organically inhering in the knowing process. It is the logically formed pattern of the conduct of reflective thinking experiences, incorporating the logically formed patterns of “discovery” and “verification” thinking experiences, conducted well and ill by persons obligated to conduct them as well as they can, for example, persons in knowing processes in a variety of “knowledge societies,” aka, information, information revolution, knowledge, third wave, informatization, and networks societies.

Such a variety ranges:

1. from persons obligated in scientific knowledge societies, for example:

1.1. those persons obligated to meet the challenge of conditionally organizing their situated knowing processes in which reflective thinking experiences organically inhere, as practiced in sociology, psychology, anthropology, and history, to;

1.2. those persons obligated to meet this challenge, as practiced in economics, politicology, jurisprudence, and praxiology;

2. from persons obligated in other scientific knowledge societies, for example:

2.1. those persons obligated to meet the challenge of conditionally organizing their situated knowing processes in which reflective thinking experiences organically inhere, as practiced in physics, chemistry, and biology, to;

2.2. those persons obligated to meet this challenge, as practiced in physical technology, chemical technology, and biological technology;

3. from persons obligated in “humanities” knowledge societies, for example:

3.1. those persons obligated to meet the challenge of conditionally organizing their situated knowing processes in which reflective thinking experiences organically inhere as practiced in “literature;” art, and music, to;

3.2. those persons obligated to meet this challenge, as practiced in theology;

4. from persons obligated in philosophical knowledge societies, for example:

4.1. those persons obligated to meet the challenge of conditionally organizing their situated knowing processes in which reflective thinking experiences organically inhere, as practiced in rationalism, empiricism, logical positivism, and pragmatism, to;

4.2. those persons obligated to meet this challenge, as practiced in existentialism.

Persons involved in knowledge societies, then, are persons obligated to meet the challenge of organizing knowing processes in which reflective thinking experiences organically inhere:

1. as practiced in the organization of conditions, i.e. in the conditional organization, of their knowledge society;

2. as determined by knowing processes in which organically inhere features of reflective thinking experiences, selected by their knowledge society for emphasis and being focused upon from the mapping of these features, and;

3. as subject matter inherent to educology as subject matter for philosophy in philosophy of educology.

Philosophy of educology, then, in general has educology:

1. as subject matter composed of knowing processes in which organically inhere features of reflective thinking experiences, hence;

2. as subject matter accounting for the process of regulating the meeting and managing of persons, including themselves;

2.1. for the purpose of providing a conditional organization of knowing processes in which organically inhere features of reflective thinking experiences to be conducted by persons, well, i.e;

2.2. for the purpose of providing conditions for organizing the social processes involving persons meeting and managing other persons, including themselves, in which the conduct of inquiry;

2.2.1. obligates persons to authentically conduct, well, discovery thinking experiences, as involved in reflective thinking experiences in some situation, and;

2.2.2. obligates persons to truly conduct, well, verification thinking experiences, as involved in reflective thinking experiences, in some situation.

Educology, itself, then, is subject matter that is the territory of empirical philosophy, in experiential philosophy of educology, wherein, in general, it, i.e. educology, is subject matter for philosophy, whereby, then, philosophy selectively emphasizes and focuses on:

1. the conduct of reflective thinking experiences organically inhering in knowing processes, and;

2. the synergetic effects in and on, and that which causes the synergetic effects in and on, the conduct of reflective thinking experiences organically inhering in knowing processes in some situation, for example;

2.1. the governing factors of policy development practices, and, supervisory and administrative practices as these factors have and do not have synergetic effects in and on the conduct of reflective thinking experiences organically inhering in knowing processes, and;

2.2. the cultural factors, for example;

2.2.1. of forms of governments, economies, law, habitus, and memes;

2.2.2. of forms of media and telecommunication networks;

2.2.3. of form of sports and entertainment businesses;

2.2.4. of forms of industrialized science and technology business corporations, and;

2.2.5 of forms of information theory and knowledge societies;

as these factors have and do not have synergetic effects in and on the conduct of reflective thinking experiences organically inhering in knowing processes in some situation, and, by;

2.3. the ecosystem factors of, for example;

2.3.1. of eco-systems, communities, and populations and of habitats and niches;

2.3.2. of bio-geo-chemical water, oxygen, and nitrogen eco-cycles. and;

2.3.3. of biotic and abiotic natural environments involving the trophic, i.e. nutritive, pyramids of feeding levels, food chains, and food webs; as these factors have and do not have synergetic effects in and on the conduct of reflective thinking experiences organically inhering in knowing processes in some situation.

Philosophy of educology, then, has logically, epistemologically, and axiologically entailed orientations in that:

1. it is axiologically oriented around the value of doing something as well as it can be done, wherein;

2. as oriented epistemologically, the doing something as well as it can be done is that of conducting knowing processes as well as they can be conducted, and;

3. as oriented logically in accord with the logic of reflective thinking experiences organically inhering in knowing processes.

Implied by these entailed orientations in philosophy of educology, as axiologically, epistemologically, and logically related issues in philosophy, is philosophical educology, also, as an axiologically related issue in philosophy.

Philosophical educology, i.e. empirical philosophy of education as empirical philosophy of educational processes, is empirical axiological philosophy of educational processes as processes conditionally organized in home, school, and community educational institutions. From the axiological perspective of philosophical educology, as being developed in the Institute:

1. educative experiences organically inhering in educational processes ought to be valued by being organized to meet the conditions:

1.1. entailed by an axiological orientation of philosophy of educology, i.e. the prescription to value doing something as well as it can be done in educational processes, as social processes conducted in home, school, and community educational institutions, and;

1.2. entailed by an epistemological orientation of philosophy of educology, i.e. the prescription to value doing something as well as it can be done to be the prescription to value the conduct of educative experiences as they organically inhere in educational processes, i.e. social processes conducted in home, school, and community educational institutions, and;

1.3. the prescription implied by the entailed obligation to conduct educative experiences organically inhering in educational processes, i.e;

1.3.1. the prescription to organize the conditions in which educative experiences organically inhere in educational processes conducted in home, school, and community educational institutions, to be;

1.3.2. modeled after the value of the organization of the conditions in which the reflective thinking experiences organically inhere in knowing processes conducted in knowledge societies, and ought to be obliged to be conducted by persons inside of educational institutions, and;

2. the educational process, organized to meet the conditions prescribed in philosophical educology, as stated above, ought to be valued and selectively emphasized and focused upon, i.e. ought to be valued and mapped, as subject matter for scientific educology.

From the experientially oriented philosophy of educology perspective of the Institute, as a kind of empirically oriented philosophy of educology perspective, the account above was intended to be an introduction to work in philosophy of educology, hence, in philosophy, aimed at meeting:

Challenge 1: the philosophical challenge of clarifying the nature of educological knowledge, i.e. of educology and its subject matter of the educational process, and;

Challenge 2: the philosophical challenge of critiquing experiences in the areas of interest of logic, psychology, problematics, and methodology as disciplines that conditionally organize the features of reflective thinking experiences, whereby, these experiences:

2.1. that when conducted well produces the body of educological knowledge, and, also that produces all other bodies of knowledge, and;

2.2. that functions as a model for educative experiences, that ought to be better integrated into the organization of conditions in which the educational process is conducted.

The account was also intended to be a sign to signify work done in the past, in and out of the Journal, and, work to be done in the future, in and out of the Journal, by scientific and philosophical educologists and philosophers of educology, in respect to these philosophical challenges in philosophy of educology.

In past issues of the Journal published from 1987 to 2003, Challenge 1, i.e. the philosophical challenge of clarifying the nature of educological knowledge and its subject matter of the educational process was attended to, however, Challenge 2, i.e. the philosophical challenge of critiquing the experience of areas of interest of logic, psychology, problematics, and methodology as disciplines that conditionally organize the features of reflective thinking experiences, was not attended to.

During this time, Challenge 1 was attended to primarily from an analytically oriented philosophy of educology perspective, rather than from an experientially oriented philosophy of educology perspective, both as kinds of an empirically oriented philosophy of educology perspective.

From within an analytic, rather than an experiential, philosophy of educology perspective, then, the content of the Journal was formatted with the interpretation of Kant’s first philosophy epistemologically oriented discernment between two forms of sentential meaning in language, two forms of experiences in life, two forms of non-innate knowledge in the conduct of the knowing process, and; one form of innate knowledge in the conduct of the knowing process:

1. from an early and later Wittgensteinian post modern functionally oriented epistemological perspective, in the philosophy of logical positivism, rather than;

2. from a Piercian post modern functionally oriented epistemological perspective, in the philosophy of pragmatism; wherefore, then, Kant’s first philosophy discernment of these forms, as epistemologically oriented discernments, are:

2.1. between;

2.1.1. analytic forms of sentential meaning, as meaning stated and formed in statements I in language;

2.1.2. synthetic forms of sentential meaning, as meaning stated and formed in statements in language;

2.2. between;

2.2.1. a-priori forms of experience as forms outside of experiences in life;

2.2.2. a-posteriori forms of experience as forms inside of experiences in life, and;

2.3. between;

2.3.1. analytic a-priori forms of knowledge, as;

2.3.1.1. non-innate outside of experience;

2.3.1.2. truly formed analytic meanings as tautological relationships of meanings in

statements in language;

2.3.2. synthetic a-posteriori forms of knowledge, as;

2.3.2.1. non-innate inside of experience;

2.3.2.2. truly formed synthetic meanings as non-tautological relationships of meanings in statements in language and;

2.3.3. synthetic a-priori form of knowledge, as;

2.3.3.1. innate outside of experience;

2.3.3.2. truly formed pre-dispositions to conduct the knowing process in life experiences, using language, well, and; were interpreted as discernments;

They were interpreted as discernments:

1. of functions of meaning states in the conduct of experience in the areas of interest of logic, psychology, problematics, and methodology as disciplines that conditionally organize the features of reflective thinking experiences of ordinary, scientific, and philosophic languages, in accord;

1.1. to how the non-innately;

1.1.1. true and false analytically formed sentential meaning states, and;

1.1.2. true and false synthetically formed sentential meaning states;

1.2. in these ordinary, scientific, and philosophic languages;

1.2.1. are comported well;

1.2.2. into the conduct of the conjunction of the disciplines of the logic, psychology, problematics, and methodology of verification thinking experiences;

1.2.3. as an aspect of the conjunction of these disciplines as conducted in reflective thinking experiences, and;

1.3. integrated and conducted well;

1.4. in the knowing process, rather than;

2. of functions of meaning states in the conduct of experience in the areas of interest of logic, psychology, problematics, and methodology as disciplines that conditionally organize the features of reflective thinking experiences of ordinary, scientific, and philosophic languages, in accord;

2.1. to how the non-innately;

2.1.1. true and false analytically formed sentential meaning states;

2.1.2. true and false synthetically formed sentential meaning states, and;

2.2. to how the innately;

2.2.1. and truly formed pre-disposition;

2.2.2. to conduct the knowing process;

2.3. are comported well;

2.4. into the conduct of reflective thinking experiences;

2.5. as conduct of;

2.5.1. the aspect of discovery thinking experiences, and;

2.5.2. the aspect of verification thinking experiences;

2.5.3. as two necessary and sufficient aspects of the;

2.6. conduct of reflective thinking experiences;

2.7. integrated and conducted well;

2.8 in the knowing process.

Also, from within an analytic, rather than an experiential, philosophy of educology perspective, the content of the Journal was formatted with the interpretation of:

1. Descartes’ epistemologically oriented discernment of doubt existing as a systematic rule integrated well into the knowing process conducted well, rather than of;

2. Pierce’s epistemologically oriented discernment of doubt existing as an irritable feeling, accompanying realistic imagination, interrupting urges to act, i.e. interrupting conations, as feelings of unsettlement integrated well into the knowing process conducted well, and, of;

3. Descartes’ ontologically oriented discernment of physical and mental substances.

From within an analytic, rather than an experiential, philosophy of educology perspective, the content of the Journal, then, was formatted with the interpretation of these discernments in philosophy:

1. from only the verification thinking experiences, as conducted in reflective thinking experiences, accounted for in the post modern era philosophy of logical positivism;

2. rather than from the conduct of both:

2.1. the aspect of discovery thinking experiences, and;

2.2. the aspect of verification thinking experiences; as two necessary and sufficient aspects of the conduct of reflective thinking experiences, accounted for in the post modern era philosophy of pragmatism, and, adopted in experiential philosophy of educology as being developed in the Institute.

Analytical philosophy of educology, in the past, besides providing perspective for formatting the content and publication of the Journal, it, also provided perspective for work by its co-editors, Christensen and Fisher, out of the Journal from 1987 to 2003, in that it:

2. was used in their co-editorship of Organization and Colleges of Education: An Educological Perspective, Educology Research Associates, Sydney, Australia, 1983, wherein, an introduction is made of the account in the book of how courses and academic staff, in units in universities, the names of which contain the word ‘education’ e.g. colleges, divisions, and departments of, and, courses in education, but, better named by a

name containing the word ‘educology’ e.g. colleges, divisions, and departments of, and, courses in educology, as they are in universities in Lithuania, Europe, can and ought to be organized so that conditions in knowledge society units in university educational situations include features constituting a structure that achieves logical consistency; retains flexibility; dispels ambiguity; overcomes undue pressure from traditional prejudices and interest groups; permits professional individuality and development, but excludes exploitation of the institution by the individual staff members, and; assures the integrity of the institution without stifling the creativity and responsible freedom of the professional staff members.

Analytical philosophy of educology, also, provided perspective for:

1. the below listed four important pieces of work in and out of the Journal, by Christensen:

1.1. Perspectives on Education as Educology (edited by J.E. Christensen, Washington, D.C. University Press of America,1981);

1.2. Education and Human Development: A Study in Educology (J.E. Christensen, Educology Research Associates, Sydney, 1981);

1.3. “Education, Educology and Educological Discourse: Theory and Structure for Education and Constructive Action in Education” (J.E. Christensen, International Journal of Educology, 1:1, 1987, 1-32), and;

1.4. “Education for Freedom: A Philosophical Educology” (J.E. Christensen, International Journal of Educology, 6:2, 1992, 97-131);

2. the below listed two important pieces of work, in and out of the Journal, by Fisher

2.1. “An Introduction to Home Educology and Home Education in the USA” (James E. Fisher, International Journal of Educology, 6:2, 1992, 170-207)

3. the below listed five important pieces of work in and out of the Journal, by Maccia, Brezinka, and Monshouwer:

3.1. “Education for Humanity: A Philosophical Educology” (George S. Maccia, The International Journal of Educology, 6:1, 1992, 11-18)

3.2. “The Genesis of Educology” (George S. Maccia, Perspective on Education as Educology, Edited by James E. Christensen, 1981, 27-50)

3.3. “Meta-Theory of Education: European Contributions from an Empirical-Analytical Point of View” (Wolfgang Brezinka, Perspective on Education as Educology, Edited by James E. Christensen, 1981, 7-26)

3.4. “The Formal Structure of an Emerging Science of Education, Part I: Some Opinions about the Scientific Status of a Science of Education” (Anton Monshouwer, Perspective on Education as Educology, Edited by James E. Christensen, 1981, 51-86)

3.5. “The Formal Structure of an Emerging Science of Education, Part II: The Concept of Science” (Anton Monshouwer, Perspective on Education as Educology, Edited by James E. Fisher, 1981, 159-196)

An unfavorable critique of the analytical philosophy of educology perspective was conducted in 1988, after working, in general, in this perspective from the 1960s up to the 1988 point in time, by Steiner in “Crisis in Educology” (Elizabeth Steiner (Maccia)), Educology ’86: Proceedings of a Conference on Educational Research, Inquiry and Development with an Educological Perspective in Canberra, Educology Research Associates, Sydney, 1986, 221-228). This work is clearly in the phenomenological philosophy of educology perspective, in which Steiner:

1. critiques, favorably, the conduct of a systematic phenomenology as the conduct of a phenomenological method, i.e. a method constituted by: “formal patterns of intuition, rules for intuitive thinking, in order to present the essence of phenomena. It is the doing of descriptive metaphysics.” (pg. 226); whereby, then, essences exist in; “the ideational realm” of consciousness. (pg. 226);

2. interprets the educational process as phenomena: “that involves subjects; subjects who are guiding the formation of consciousness of other subjects (learners) and so are teachers, and subjects (learners) who are actively participating in the formation of their consciousness and so are students. To study education, therefore, is also to study consciousness, namely the conscious formation of consciousness.” (pg. 222), and, in conclusion;

3. states:

“If one follows the rules of the phenomenological method, then one can grasp essences. These essences are not relative, i.e., arbitrarily introduced by human beings through their conventions insofar as they assign meanings. Meanings are not arbitrarily assigned; there are essences to be grasped. The world which is experienced after the reduction to the pure life of consciousness is an intersubjective world, it is accessible to anyone. So the essence of education can be grasped. The metaphysics of education can be done. The essential properties of teacher, student, content, and context—the elements of the teaching-studenting process—can be set forth. A meaning basis for empirical studies of regularities can be provided. The crisis in educology can be resolved. Phenomenology is a genuine rationalism.” (pg. 227)

It is to be noted that Steiner, uses the meaning of the word ‘essence’ to refer to that which exists as ideations and that which “assigns meaning,” to be the basis of something, whereby, though, essences or ideations as forms, structures, or states are not identical to the existence of meaning, itself, whereby, then;

1. that which exists;

1.1. as a special, essential, or ideational property as a state of status that specially, essentially, or ideationally forms a state of status of something to be what it is and not to be some other special, essential, or ideational form of thing, therefore;

1.1.1. that which exists that specially, i.e., essentially forms or states of the “pure life of consciousness;” i.e;

1.1.2. a life that, after conducting reductive thinking by following a set of “rules of intuitive thinking;”

1.1.3. is a life of being conscious of pure essences or ideations as forms that state the status of things, i.e;

1.1.4. a life of consciousness that can be “grasped,” or directly and immediately known;

1.1.4.1. by intellectual observation, but;

1.1.4.2. not by sensory observation, hence;

2. that which exists;

2.1. that determines;

2.1.1. a life of pure forms as a life purely known by persons referred to by the meaning of the word ‘subjects’ following the conduct of a set of rules for thinking in which to make intellectual observations of essences or ideations that form things,” and;

2.1.2. a life of impure forms as a life impurely known by persons referred to by the meaning of the word ‘subjects’ following the conduct of a set of rules for thinking in which to make sensory observation of the things, but not the essences or ideations that form things, hence;

2.1.3. a life in an interactive and “intersubjective world,” that:

2.1.4. “is accessible to anyone,” and;

2.2. that provides:

2.2.1. “a meaning basis, state, or status for empirical studies of regularities,” in and for the educational process, i.e. of the regulations in and for the educational process, therefore;

2.2.2. a foundation for empirical scientific and empirical philosophic educology of this process.

In this work, Steiner critiques, unfavorably, the analytical philosophy of educology perspective, as being:

1. a limited perspective in that it is grounded in a philosophy of logic from the perspective of the philosophy of logical positivism, or as she would characterize it, from the perspective of a naturalistically oriented philosophy of science, wherein;

2. this logic, as a methodology of science, i.e. as knowledge about a method for conducting science, when integrated and conducted well in the knowing process, for producing scientific and philosophic educology, i.e. for producing scientific and philosophic knowledge about the educational process;

3. does not adequately account for the significance of the educational process, as this process; from the perspective of phenomenological philosophy of educology;

4. involves persons, as subjects, conducting the conduct of the conscious formation of consciousness, as integrated well into educational phenomena, modeled after the well conduct of systematic phenomenology, integrated well into the knowing process, in that, as Steiner says:

“. . . consciousness is not simply a cognitive state. A cognitive state cannot occur without volition and feeling. Conation is involved, because signs are always standing for somebody. An ‘I’ gives meaning; there is intentionality. Moreover, since there is self-awareness, there is feeling; there is a state of affect. Within experiencing or consciousness, we can logically sort out cognition, conation, and affect, but in any experiencing all three are together.” (pg. 224)

Steiner is making a very similar, if not identical, point that was made earlier, from the experiential philosophy of educology perspective, i.e. the point that the analytical philosophy of educology perspective is limited in that:

1. its logic is that of the conduct of only verification thinking experiences, as conducted in reflective thinking experiences;

2. rather than the conduct of both:

2.1. discovery thinking experiences, and;

2.2. verification thinking experiences;

3. as two necessary aspects of the conduct of the conduct of reflective thinking experiences;

4. accounted for in the post modern era philosophy of pragmatism, and;

5. adopted in experiential philosophy of educology;

6. as being developed in the Institute.

The point in common between phenomenological philosophy of educology and experiential philosophy of educology is that both logics incorporate “cognition, conation, and affect,” as well as volition and eidetic imagery, i.e. imagination, into the breadth of aspects of consciousness, whereas, however, analytical philosophy of educology incorporates only cognition into the breadth of consciousness, whereby:

1. the cognitive aspect as a logical state of consciousness;

1.1. in the phenomenological philosophy of educology perspective;

1.1.1. is that aspect which constitutes the essences or ideational, i.e. the formal aspect of phenomena, that is consciously intellected, and;

1.1.2. is the logical state of status of consciousness;

1.2. in the experiential philosophy of educology perspective;

1.2.1. is that aspect which constitutes the meanings, i.e. the formal aspect of possible forms or states of conduct that is consciously intellected, and;

1.2.2. is the logical state of consciousness, and;

1.3. in the analytical philosophy of educology perspective;

1.3.1. is that aspect which constitutes the analytic a-priori knowledge, i.e. the formal aspect of tautological relationships of meanings that is consciously intellected, and;

1.3.2. is the logical state of consciousness;

1.4. all of which are integrated and conducted well in the knowing process, and;

2. the conative, affective, volitional, and imaginative aspects as psychical events in consciousness;

2.1. in the phenomenological philosophy of educology perspective;

2.1.1. are the aspects that constitute the psychical events;

2.1.2. in consciousness that are sensed;

2.1.3. by internal sensory observation, and, are;

2.1.4. events in consciousness;

2.1.5. to be selectively emphasized and focused on, i.e. mapped, as;

2.1.5.1. the subject matter for psychology, as knowledge about the psyche, and

2.1.5.2 the subject matter to be;

2.1.6. dissociated from;

2.1.7. the cognitive aspect, as the logical state, of consciousness by;

2.1.8. following the conduct of systematic phenomenology, as

2.1.9. well integrated and conducted;

2.1.10. in the pure knowing of essences as forms or states of phenomena feature of

2.1.11. the knowing process;

2.2. in the experiential philosophy of educology perspective;

2.2.1. are the aspects that constitute the psychical events;

2.2.2. in consciousness that are sensed;

2.2.3. by internal sensory observation, and, are;

2.2.4. events in consciousness

2.2.5. to be selectively emphasized and focused on, i.e. mapped, as

2.2.5.1. the subject matter for psychology, as knowledge about the psyche, and

2.2.5.2. the subject matter to be;

2.2.6. associated with;

2.2.7. the cognitive aspect, as the logical state, of consciousness by

2.2.8 following the conduct of reflective thinking experiences, as constituted by;

2.2.8.1. the conduct of discovery thinking experiences, and;

2.2.8.2. the conduct of verification thinking experiences, as;

2.2.9. well integrated and conducted in

2.2.10. the understanding of meanings as possible forms of states of conduct feature of

2.2.11. the knowing process, and;

2.3. in the analytical philosophy of educology perspective;

2.3.1. are the aspects that constitute the psychical events:

2.3.2. in consciousness that are sensed;

2.3.3. by internal sensory observation, and, are;

2.3.4. events in consciousness;

2.3.5. to be selectively emphasized and focused on, i.e. mapped, as;

2.3.5.1. the subject matter for psychology, as knowledge about the psyche, and

2.3.5.2. the subject matter to be;

2.3.6. dissociated from;

2.3.7. the cognitive aspect, as the logical state, of consciousness;

2.3.8. by following only the conduct of verification thinking experiences, as

2.3.9. well integrated and conducted in

2.3.10. the analytic knowing of tautological relationships of meanings as states feature of:

2.3.11. the knowing process

This critique of the breadth of psychical aspects, as psychical events, in consciousness in analytical philosophy of educology, as a limitation from the perspective of phenomenological philosophy of educology, correlates with a critical difference between phenomenological and experiential philosophies of educology, and, between them and analytical philosophy of educology, as that of how the meaning of the word ‘cognition’ is used when referencing an aspect of, i.e. a state of, not events in, consciousness involved in logic as conducted and integrated well in the knowing process.

Whereas:

1. as constituted in phenomenological philosophy of educology, the meaning of the word ‘cognition’ is used:

1.2. of the existence of “essences or ideations as actual forms of phenomena;”

1.3. as kinds of metaphysical existents, and;

1.4. as the “given” in the logical state of, not psychical events in, consciousness, that;

1.5. “assigns” meaning states, that;

1.6. “comports” significant conduct in;

1.7. the conduct of the conscious formation of consciousness;

1.8. constituted in the conduct of systematic phenomenology;

1.9. as integrated and conducted well;

1.10. in the knowing process;

2. as constituted in experiential philosophy of educology, the meaning of the word ‘cognition’ is used:

2.1. to refer to the direct and immediate intellectual observation, intuition, grasping, or direct and immediate understanding;

2.2. of the existence of “meaning states as possible forms of conduct;”

2.3. as kinds of special conduct, and;

2.4. as the “given” in the logical state of, not psychical events in, consciousness, that;

2.5. “comports” significant conduct in;

2.6. the conduct of reflective thinking experiences;

2.7. constituted by the conjugation of;

2.7.1. the conduct of discovery thinking experiences, and;

2.7.2. the conduct of verification thinking experiences;

2.8. as integrated and conducted well;

2.9. in the knowing process, and;

3. as constituted in analytical philosophy of educology, the meaning of the word ‘cognition’ is used:

3.1. to refer to the direct and immediate intellectual observation, intuition, grasping, or direct and immediate analytic knowing;

3.2. of the existence of “tautological relationships of meanings as states of actual physical forms of referents;”

3.3. as the only kinds of referents that can be verified;

3.4. as the “given” in the logical state of, not psychical events in the consciousness of verification thinking experiences, that;

3.5. “comports” significant conduct in;

3.6. the conduct of sensory experience;

3.7. the conduct of symbolic logic;

3.8. as integrated and conducted well;

3.9. in the knowing process.

The fundamental difference, then, between phenomenological, experiential, and analytical philosophies of educology is that of the difference in the use of the meaning of the word ‘cognition’ to refer to cognition:

1. as a logical state of, not as a psychical event in, pure knowing of essences as forms of phenomena;

2. as a logical state of, not as a psychical event in, understanding of meanings as possible forms of conduct, and;

3. as a logical state of, not as a psychical event in, analytic knowing of tautological relationships of meanings as actual forms of physical referents, as these relationships between meanings are integrated into the conduct of the conjunction of the logic and psychology of the knowing process.

With this discernment between the logical state of consciousness, intellectually observed, and psychical events in consciousness, internally sensorily observed:

1. in phenomenological philosophy of educology’s logic, the meaning of the word ‘cognitive’ implies the direct and immediate “pure knowing” of essences as actual forms or states of things being well integrated and conducted in the knowing process;

2. in experiential philosophy of educology’s logic, the meaning of the word ‘cognitive’ implies the direct and immediate “understanding” of meanings as possible forms or states of conduct being well integrated andconducted in the knowing process, and;

3. in analytical philosophy of educology’s logic, the meaning of the word ‘cognitive’ implies the direct and immediate “analytic knowing” of tautological relationships of meanings as actual forms or states of physical referents being well integrated and conducted in the knowing process.

Using the meaning of the word ‘cognition’, in the perspective of phenomenological philosophy of educology, the knowing process, as the well conduct of the conscious formation of consciousness is well integrated into it, is such that, if followed well, then;

1. pure states, i.e. essences or ideations as actual forms or states of things can be grasp, intuited, intellectually observed, i.e. directly and immediately known, as they exist as cognitive states, i.e. logical states of pure consciousness of subjects, in so far as, however;

2. impure events, i.e. imagination of psychic images, emotion of psychic feelings, volition of psychic determination to move, and, conation of psychic urges to move, that exist as psychical events in the consciousness of subjects are:

2.1. selectively emphasized and focused on so as;

2.2. to disassociate them, by excluding them, from being focused on;

2.2.1. so that the pure states of, i.e. the essences as forms of, things;

2.2.2. in the consciousness of subjects;

2.3. can be selectively emphasized and focused on;

2.3.1. to be grasp, intuited, intellectually observed, i.e. directly, immediately, and purely known;

2.3.2. so as to assign states of meaning, not events of imagery and/or feelings;

3.3.3. to be well integrated;

2.4. into the knowing process conducted well, therefore;

2.4.1. providing a logical state for;

2.4.2. internally and externally oriented sensory observations;

2.4.3. in verification thinking experiences.

Using the meaning of the word ‘cognition’ from the perspective of experiential philosophy of educology, the knowing process, as the well conduct of discovery and verification thinking experiences, in the reflective thinking experience, is well integrated into it, is such that, if followed well, then;

1. as possible forms of conduct, states of meanings can be grasp, intuited, intellectually observed, i.e. directly and immediately understood, as they exist in the cognitive, i.e. logical, state of consciousness of subjects, in so far as;

2. imagination, emotion, volition, and conation as psychical events in the consciousness of subjects exist in association with possible forms of conduct as meaning states existing as the cognitive, i.e. logical, state or status of consciousness of subjects, whereby, the psychical events are:

2.1. selectively emphasized and focused on so as;

2.1.1. to associate them, by including them, with;

2.1.2. possible forms of conduct, as states of meanings;

2.1.3. in the logical state of consciousness of subjects;

2.1.4. so that states of meanings as plausible forms of conduct:

2.2. can be selectively emphasized and focused on;

2.2.1. to be grasp, intuited, intellectually observed, i.e. directly and immediately understood;

2.2.2. so that meaningful conduct becomes integrated well;

2.3. into the knowing process conducted well, therefore;

2.3.1.providing a logical state for;

2.3.2. sensory observations, in;

2.3.3. discovery thinking experiences, and, in;

2.3.4. verification thinking experiences, in:

2.4. the conduct of reflective thinking experiences;

Using the meaning of the word ‘cognition’ from the perspective of analytical philosophy of educology, the knowing process, as the conduct of only verification thinking experiences, is such that, if followed well, then;

1. meanings as actual forms or logical states for referencing only physical referents can be grasp, intuited, intellectually observed, i.e. directly and immediately analytically known, as they condition the consciousness of subjects, in so far as;

2. imagination, emotion, conation, and volition as psychical events in consciousness exist in disassociation with meanings as possible forms or states of conduct in verification thinking experiences of subjects, whereby, the psychical events in consciousness are:

2.1. selectively emphasized and focused on so as;

2.1.1. to disassociate, by excluding them, from;

2.1.2. meanings as actual forms or states for only referencing;

2.1.3. physical events and objects;

2.1.4. in verification of thinking experiences;

2.2. so that meanings, also, as plausible forms or states of conduct:

2.2.1. can be selectively emphasized and focused on;

2.2.2. to be grasped, intuited, intellectually observed, i.e. directly and immediately; analytically known as tautological relationships of meanings;

2.2.3. for meaningful conduct becoming integrated well;

2.3. into the knowing process conducted well, therefore;

2.4. providing a logical state for;

2.5. sensory observations, in;

2.6. the conduct of verification thinking experiences.

From the perspective of experiential philosophy of educology, then, both analytical and phenomenological philosophies of educology are critiqued, unfavorably, hence, are limited in that they both disassociate, by excluding, psychical events in consciousness from the logical state of consciousness, in the knowing process, though in different ways, whereas, however, experiential philosophy of educology, associates, by including, them in consciousness in the knowing process, in that:

1. Phenomenological philosophy of educology does the dissociation:

1.1. directly through its rules of reduction, constituting;

1.2. the conduct of systematic phenomenology;

1.3. involving eidetic reduction, i.e.

1.4. dissociating, by excluding;

1.4.1. imagery in imagination, feelings in emotion, urges to move in conation, and determination to move in volition;

1.4.2. as psychical events in consciousness, and;

1.4.3. sensorily observed;

1.4.4. by internally oriented sensory observation, and;

1.4. dissociating, by excluding;

1.4.1. physical events external to consciousness;

1.4.2. as sensorily observed;

1.4.3. by internally oriented sensory observation, and;

1.5. associating, by including;

1.6. intellectual observations of essences, i.e. of ideations,

1.7. as purely knowing, i.e. purely cognizing;

1.8. the logical states of consciousness;

1.9. as actual forms of phenomenon;

1.10. as integrated and conducted well;

1.11. in the knowing process, and;

2.1. indirectly through its rules of reduction, constituting;

2.2. the conduct of symbolic logic;

2.3. involving declaratively formed sentences functioning as statements, i.e;

2.4. involving sententially formed meanings, as logically formed cognitive states, in;

2.5. ordinary, scientific, and philosophical languages;

2.5.1. being reduced to atomic, or, protocol sententially formed meaning states;

2.5.2. referring to, and only to;

2.5.3. physical event and objects

2.5.4. external to consciousness;

2.5.5. sensorily observed;

2.5.6. by externally oriented sensory observation;

2.6. dissociating, by excluding, psychical events;

2.6.1. in consciousness;

2.6.2. sensorily observed;

2.6.3. by internally oriented sensory observation, but;

2.7. associating, by including, the logical state;

2.7.1. of analytic knowing, i.e. analytic cognizing;

2.7.2. tautological relationships of meanings;

2.7.3. intellectually observed;

2.7.4. as actual forms of physical events and objects, and;

2.8. associating, by including, physical events and objects;

2.8.1. sensorily observed;

2.8.2. by externally oriented sensory observation;

2.9. as integrated and conducted well;

2.10. in the knowing process, and;

3. Experiential philosophy of educology does the association:

3.1. directly through its principle of eduction, involved in;

3.2. the conduct of reflective thinking experiences, constituted by;

3.2.1. the conduct of discovery thinking experiences, and;

3.2.2. the conductof verification thinking experiences;

3.3. involving declaratively formed sentences functioning as statements, i.e;

3.4. involving sententially formed meanings states in;

3.5. ordinary, scientific, and philosophical languages;

3.5.1. being educted for;

3.5.2. referring to, but, not only to;

3.5.3. physical events and objects, hence;

3.6. associating, by including, psychical events;

3.6.1. internal to consciousness;

3.6.2. sensorily observed;

3.6.3. by internally oriented sensory observation, and;

3.7. associating, by including, physical aspects;

3.7.1. external to consciousness;

3.7.2. sensorily observed;

3.7.3. by externally oriented sensory observation, and;

3.8. associating, by including, logical states;

3.8.1. of understanding meanings;

3.8.2. as forms or states of possible conduct

3.8.3. intellectually observed;

3.8.4. internal to consciousness;

3.9. as integrated and conducted well;

3.10. in the knowing process.

From the perspective of experiential philosophy of educology, the main outcome of the critique is that the analytical philosophy of educology and phenomenological philosophy of educology perspectives are shown to be limited in that they disassociate, by excluding, the psychical aspects, i.e. psychical events, from the logical aspect, i.e. logical state, in consciousness by the conduct they purport to integrate and conduct well, hence, providing an inappropriate model for conduct to be well integrated into the educational process, whereby;

1. from the analytical philosophy of educology perspective it is conduct of verification thinking experiences;

1.1 involving the conduct of reduction;

1.2. by following the rules of symbolic logic, and;

2. from the phenomenological philosophy of educology perspective it is the conduct of the conscious formation of consciousness;

2.1. involving the conduct of reduction;

2.2. by following the rules of systematic phenomenology, and; in contrast;

3. from the experiential philosophy of educology perspective it is the conduct of reflective thinking experiences;

3.1. involving the conduct of eduction;

3.2. by following the principles of;

3.2.1. discovery thinking experiences, in conjunction with;

3.3.1. verification thinking experiences.

From the perspective of the Institute, the work to be done in the future in philosophy of educology, as stated earlier, is that of meeting two challenges, i.e:

Challenge 1: the philosophical challenge of clarifying the nature of educological knowledge, i.e.of educology and its subject matter of the educational process, and;

Challenge 2: the philosophical challenge of critiquing the conduct of reflective thinking experiences;

2.1.as the conduct that integrates, well, the organization of conditions in which the knowing process is conducted, hence, the logic that when conducted well produces the body of educological knowledge, and, also that produces all other bodies of knowledge, and;

2.2. as the conduct of reflective thinking experiences, functioning as a model for the conduct of educative experiences, ought to be better integrated into the organization of conditions in which the educational process is conducted.

The significance of this future work, from the perspective of the Institute:

1. will be to continue to show the limitations of the analytical and phenomenological philosophy of educology perspective being connected to their logics and psychologies of reduction, as;

1.1. the psychical aspects, in conscious reflective thinking experiences, being disassociated, by exclusion, from the logical aspect, of conscious reflective thinking experiences, then;

1.2. disassociating, by excluding, hence, preventing;

1.2.1. the imaginative, emotional, conative, and volitional aspects involved in discovery thinking experiences, from being conjoined with;

1.2.2. cognitive thinking experiences involved in verification thinking experiences, and, in the conscious formation of conscious thinking experiences, in;

1.2.3. reflective thinking experiences;

1.2.4. being conducted and integrated well, into ;

1.2.5. the knowing process, therefore;

2. will be to continue to show the frontiers of the experiential philosophy of educology and its conduct of eduction, as;

2.1. associating, by including, hence, developing;

2.1.1. the imaginative, emotional, conative, and volitional aspects, as the psychical aspects of conscious discovery thinking experiences, being conjoined with;

2.1.2. cognitive thinking experiences, as the logical aspect of conscious formation of conscious, and, verification thinking experiences, as

2.1.3. two necessary stages of reflective thinking experiences;

2.1.4. being conducted and integrated well, into;

2.1.5. the knowing process, therefore,

2.2. being a model for educative experiences;

2.2.1. being conducted and integrated well, into;

2.2.2. the educational process.

The significance of future work in experiential philosophy of educology, in meeting its two challenges, then, is that it will provide a body of knowledge for a profession, as referred to by the meanings, for example, of such words as ‘the profession of teaching’, ‘the profession of school teachers’, ‘the profession of school administrators’, ‘the profession of school counselors’, and, could and should be referred to by themeaning of the words ‘the profession of educologists’.

The significance of further work, then, will be that of providing for the profession of educologists to have a body of knowledge which can and will provide perspective and confidence so that “the profession” can and will have the kind of political influence it needs to arrange for the organization of conditions in which educative experiences are well integrated and conducted in the educational process of educational institutions, e.g. home, school, and community educational institutions, as modeled after reflective thinking experiences being well integrated and conducted in the knowing process.

1.1. The Recurring Editorial in the No. 1, Vol. 19, 2005 issue of cd-IJE is considered to be Version 1. Version 2 begins, then, in the Recurring Editorial in the No. 2, Vol. 29, 2005 issue of cd-IJE.

Version 2 is a modification of Version 1 in that the statement on Page I, that: “Also, in Europe pioneering work in educology has been, and is being done, by Professor Kestutis Pukelis at Vytautas Magnus University since 1991 in Lithuania.” has been modified to state that: “Also, in Europe pioneering work in educology has been done by Professor Leonas Jovaisa, recently retired from Vilnius University, and is being done by Professor Kestutis Pukelis at Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas, Lithuania and Professor Lilija Duobliene at Vilnius University, Vilnius, Lithuania, since 1991 in Lithuania.”

Therefore, Version 2 includes Professors Jovaisa and Duobliene, along with Professor Pukelis, as doing pioneering work in educology in Lithuania.

1.2. In the 2005 Vol. 19 African Special Issue the above two statements are modified, by the following statement: “Also, in Europe, before the 1991 Lithuanian Revolution, pioneering work in and about educology was done by Professor LEONAS JOVAISA. Professor Jovaisa suggested using the new term ‘educology’ and argued that when the limits of some scientific term are overstepped we need a new term, hence, because the limits of pedagogy have been overstepped by being considered to be applied psychology, the new term ‘educology’ is needed. Professors Pukelis and Duobliene, then, have continued to use and extend the term ‘educology’ since the 1991 Lithuanian Revolution.”

This statement constitutes Version 3 of the Recurring Editorial. 1.3. Version 4 is a modification of Version 3 and is one made beginning in the 2006 issues of cd-IJE. This modification is from the perspective of experiential philosophy of educology to be, generally, that of considering the experience of the conduct of the interests of logic, psychology, problematics, and methodology, rather than just logic and psychology, as the experience of the conduct of disciplines constituting educology.

(A paper presented at a Torch club meeting in Columbia, South Carolina in 2006.   According to their brochure, "TORCH is an international association of local clubs in which respected persons practicing recognized professions enjoy the cultural interchange of knowledge."  I presented the paper, being recognized as a person practicing the “profession” of philosophy of educology.)

This paper accounts for a naturalized ontology that, from the experiential philosophy of educology perspective being developed through the Institute of History and Philosophy of Educology for Developing Democracies in the World (The Institute) an iniative of Educology Research Associates/USA (ERA/USA), is implicit in John Dewey's naturalized metaphyics (naturalistic metaphysics) and provides the experiential features that are organically inherent in the conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences practiced in the knowing-inquiry process.

I have chosen the title, “Experiencing Philosophy,” to represent a meaning to use to refer to the experience of the conduct of reflective thinking about the critical problems of philosophy.  They are the problems formed in questions, as follows:

Each of these critical problems have been experienced and reflectively thought about by thusly disposed humans over time and solutions have been constructed for them, as interpreted by schools of philosophy, for example: firstly, during the pre-modern science era, within the idealism of Plato and the realism of Aristotle; secondly, during the early-modern science era, within the rationalism of Hegel and the empiricism of Locke, and; thirdly, during the middle-modern science era, within the pragmatism of Dewey and the existentialism of Sartre, with derivations formed from each of these schools.

During the later-modern science era, within the framework of these problems and schools, I have seriously reflected for over thirty years from the point of view of wondering with the problem formed in the epistemological question “What is knowledge about education?”  This question, I have come to understand as being the question “What is educology?”

For the purpose of this presentation, however, I will not engage the epistemological question “What is educology?”  The question engaged for this presentation will be only the ontological question “What exists?” 

From conducting reflective thinking experiences engaging the epistemological question “What is knowledge about education?” or “What is educology?” I came to understand, accept, and appreciate that its answer is founded on the answer to the ontological, metaphysical, epistemological, logical, ethical, and aesthetical questions.

Within the time constraints for this presentation, then, the other five critical questions in philosophy will not be considered.  Specifically, what will be considered will be the ontological problem formed in the question “What exists and how is what exists experienced?”  More accurately, what will be presented is the result of the conduct of my reflective thinking experiences, or, as John Dewey would say, what will be presented are the refinements of the conduct of my reflective thinking experiences, as engaged by the ontological problem.

The meaning of the word ‘experience’ is used to refer to that aspect of human life that includes, but is not identical to, the knowing process, hence, its meaning refers to the sensory, psychical, suppositional, and cognitive aspects of experience in connection with the knowing process as this process is conducted in life’s reflective thinking experiences. 

What will be presented will be an account of what I consider a rendition and extension of Dewey’s work in the pragmatic school of philosophy of what exists and how what exists is experienced.  In the extension, I will use words that I have invented, with specific meanings assigned to them, and, ordinary words, with specific meanings assigned to them, that, in my opinion, help to perform a true rendering and extending. 

The account to be presented is a modification of selected features from a book published by the name of Analytic Philosophy of Education as a Sub-Discipline of Educology:  An Introduction to its Techniques and Application.  I co-authored this book with a friend and colleague in philosophy of educology, James E. Christensen, in 1979 through the University Press of America, while I was Head of the Department of Education and Professor of Education (Educology) at Kansas Newman College, Wichita, Kansas.  Jim was professing education (educology) in a university in Australia, at that time.  This book was written from the perspective of analytic philosophy of educology, a derivation of Locke’s empiricism, as his empiricism was accounted for in logical positivism.

During the presentation, I request that you reflexively think about your own experiences, as to what they can be named and as to what is experienced by them, as can be named.  The request, then, is that you think about your own experiences and about what exists that are experienced by these experiences, and, reflect about what word meanings to use to refer to them.  This request entails, what in philosophy is known as the “bracketing” of word meanings that have been used to make such references, and, that have been used to enculturalize the knowledge societies of science, technology, history, religion, philosophy.  During the presentation, periodically, I will call attention to the need for bracketing certain meanings.

With the above background, I will begin the body of this presentation in ontology with the following list of sententially formed meanings in the true ontological statements; S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, S6, S7, S8, S9, and S10.  These statements will be considered to be ontological statements of facts that are verifiable by any human’s reflective thinking experiences conducted with the disposition to work at clarifying the meanings used to form the statements.

Statements 1 and 2

Let me call attention to the two words ‘sensception’ and ‘kinception’, respectively, in S1 and S2.  These words are ones that I invented and assigned specific meaning to, i.e. that I conceived, for the purpose of bracketing the use of the meaning of the words ‘sensory perception’, whereby, these words mean ‘knowing process, as a serialized set of actions guided by the reflective thinking experience, involving sensory experiences’.  The meaning of the word ‘perception’, with or without modification by the meaning of the word ‘sensory’, has come to be used to refer to a selected aspect of the knowing process, hence, it, strictly, is a word with a meaning to be used in the context of sentential meanings developed for the purpose of answering the epistemological question “What is knowledge?”  This presentation, then, being in ontology, is intended to be one that brackets the meaning of such epistemological words and their meanings from being used, or, if used, to be used with caution as to their overlapping use, specifically, in ontology and epistemology, but, also in metaphysics, logic, ethics, and aesthetics.

S1. Physical existence is sensorily experienced by sensception.

This statement of ontological fact is formed in sentential meaning intended to refer to the physical existence of physical objects, events, and acts, all of which can be sensorily experienced, i.e. detected, by sensception, where the meaning of the word ‘sensception’ refers to the sensations experienced by exteroceptors in the eyes, ears, nose, skin, and tongue.  Exteroceptors are receptor nerves detecting and sending physical impulses into the central nervous system, as they are sensitive to physical: (1) light rays as sensceived by eyes; (2) sound waves as sensceived by ears; (3) odor molecules as sensceived by the nose; (4) tactile pressures as sensceived by the skin, and; (5) taste molecules as sensceived by the tongue. 

The sensceptual experience can be assisted, for example, by physical devices such as glasses, contact lenses, light microscopes, and electron microscopes in that they assist seeing of physical existence of light rays by the exteroceptors in the eyes, and, by hearing aids for assisting hearing of physical existence of sound waves by exteroceptors in the ears.  Air fresheners assist the control of the physical existence of odor molecules as sensceived by exteroceptors in the nose.  Gloves assist the control of the existence of physical pressure forces as sensceived by the exteroceptors in the skin, and, spices assist the control of the physical existence of taste molecules as sensceived by the exteroceptors in the tongue.

Physical existence ranges from the smallest kind sensceivabe, referred to by the meaning of the word ‘quark’, to the largest kind sensceivable, referred to by the meaning of the word ‘universe’.  And, it ranges from the sensceivable kind, referred to by the meanings of the words, for example, ‘earth’ and ‘brain’ to the sensceivable kind, referred to by the meanings of the words ‘center of the earth’ and ‘quarks in the brain’.  Physical existence, regardless of the size or location, is the kind of existence that is sensceivable with or without assistance by physical devices.

The transductive process, as a serialized set of energized events necessarily involved in the sensceptual experience, and, is a process determined by human body sensations involving exteroceptors in the eyes.  Detected, by eye exteroceptors, are light rays emitted from a source, for example, the sun, fire, or an electric light bulb.  Light rays exist as physical energy in the form of photons, i.e. in the form of radiated energy.  Exteroceptors in the eyes, then, detect this radiated energy as a form of energy and transduce it, i.e. transformationally change it, into another form of energy referred to by the meaning of the words ‘electrical impulse’. 

Electrical impulses, as a form of energy, exist as electrons originating from a source and flowing in a direction through a channel to a destination.  In the model case of the sensceptual experience involving exteroceptors in the eyes, the origin of electrical impulses, as a form of physical energy, is from radiated energy, as a form of energy, whereby the radiated energy is transduced into electrical impulses in the exteroceptors in the eyes.  And, from the eye exteroceptors, as the source, the electrical impulses are transmitted through physical nerves, as the channel, to the physical brain, as the destination.

Involved in the transduction of the radiated form of energy to the electrical impulse form of energy are two basic physical organic structures of the eyes, i.e. the cornea and retina exteroceptors, whereby, the cornea exteroceptors detect and transmit the radiated form of energy to the retina exteroceptors as they are physically attached to the optic nerve.  In the retina the radiated form of energy is transduced to the electrical impulse form of energy, and, the electrical impulse form of energy is transmitted to the destination of the brain through and between nerve cells, i.e. neurons, involving chemical reactions referred to by the meaning of the word ‘synapses’.  A synapse is a physical point at which the electrical impulse passes from one neuron to another on its way to the brain, and, it is a physical point at which there is the transduction of the electrical impulse form of energy into the chemical form of energy, and, then, back to the electrical impulse form of energy, on its way to the brain. 

These electrical impulses, as they have originated from the exteroceptors in the eyes as the source, transmitted through the channel of the nervous system, and, arriving at specific locations in the brain, as the destination, effect the organic event referred to by the meaning of the word ‘seeing’. 

Seeing, then, involves body sensations in the transductive process and can be accounted for by the meaning of the words ‘physical synergy system’, whereby, this meaning focuses attention on the fact that seeing can be referenced as body sensations involving physical organic events effected by the physical synergism of the cooperative inter-action of: (1) physical inorganic forms of energy, e.g. radiated energy, and physical organic forms of energy, e.g. electrical impulse energy, external to human bodies, with; (2) physical organic forms of energy, e.g. electrical impulse energy, and chemical reaction energy, internal human bodies.

Also, hearing, smelling, touching, and tasting, internal to human bodies, can be accounted for as physical, and only physical, organic events occurring in a physical interactive and cooperative synergy system, involving body sensations as sensceptual experiences, though this will not be done in this presentation.  Time restraints require going to Statement 2, another ontological fact.

S2. Physiological existence is sensorily experienced by kinception.

Whereas, in the physical synergism involved in the cooperative inter-action of physical inorganic and physical organic forms of energy external to human bodies, with physical organic forms of energy internal to human bodies, as these forms of energy organically terminate in the human body sensory experiences of the brain events of seeing, hearing, smelling, touching, and tasting physical existence, as referred to by the use of the meaning of the word ‘sensception’, the meaning of the word ‘kinception’, is used to refer to the human body’s sensory experience of kinesthesia, i.e. experiencing the sensation of body positions, body movements, and/or body efforts, as detected by proprioceptors in the joints, tendons, and muscles of the human body.  The meaning of the word ‘kinception’, as used to refer to the experience of the physiological existence of these body sensations, as well as the word itself is borrowed from the meaning of the word ‘kinesthesia’.

The human body, then: (1) sensceptually experiences, through sensations by exteroceptors in the nervous system, the organic events of seeing involving eyes, hearing involving ears, smelling involving noses, touching involving skin, and, tasting involving tongues; (2) kinceptually experiences, through sensations by proprioceptors in the nervous system and the organic events of positioning, moving, and efforting involving joints, tendons, and muscles.  And, it also; (3) kinceptually experiences, through sensations by interoceptors in the nervous system, the organic events of paining and pleasuring involving, for example, stomachs.

Un-bracketing the use of the meaning of the word ‘gastronomy’ as one making epistemological reference to knowledge, specifically, knowledge about fine foods, i.e. knowledge about specific kinds of physical objects, that effect the kinceptual experiences of the sensations of the events of body pleasures, for example, in the stomach.  Were it not for the kinceptual experiences of human body pleasures and pains in the stomach, gastronomical knowledge could not exist.

Sensceptually experiencing physically existing objects, events, and acts, and kinceptually experiencing physiologically existing events of body positionings, movings, and effortings, as well as events of body painings and pleasurings, however, are not identical to perceptually experiencing such physically existing objects, events, and acts, and physiologically existing events, in that the meaning of the word ‘perceptual’, as alluded to earlier, implies reference to the knowing process, i.e. the meaning of the word ‘perceptual’ has epistemological reference.  Perceiving body seeings, hearings, smellings, touchings, tastings, and perceiving body positions, movements, and efforts, as well as, body painings and pleasurings, implies that the sensory experience of these events is a known one, hence, referable to by the use of the meaning of words for making knowledge claims.  The knowing process, as it involves the perceptual experience, strictly, must be accounted for in an epistemology based on the ontology presented here.

It is the case, then, that: (1) exteroceptors are organic mechanisms in the nervous system directly detecting body sensations of the organic existing events of seeing, hearing, smelling, touching, and tasting, i.e. of sensceptual experiences of physical existence; (2) proprioceptors are organic mechanisms in the nervous system directly detecting the body sensations of the organic existing events of body positioning, moving, and efforting, i.e. of kinceptual experiences of physiological existence, and; (3) interoceptors are organic mechanisms in the nervous system directly detecting the sensations of the organic existing events of paining and pleasuring, i.e. of kinceptual experiences of physiological existence.

Through another statement of ontological fact, i.e. through S3, various kinds of mental existence and their experiences will now be considered as to how they are to be discerned from the physical and physiological kinds of existence and their experiences.

S3. Mental feelings are psychically experienced by emotion.

Mental feelings, along with, mental images, urges, and choices are varieties of mental existence, each with their corresponding form of experience, i.e: (1) mental feelings by the psychical experience of emotion; (2) mental images by the psychical experience of imagination; (3) mental urges by the psychical experience of conation, and; (4) mental choices by the psychical experience of volition.  Mental existence is not the kind of existence that can be discerned through direct sensory experiences by exteroceptors, proprioceptors, or interoceptors, as organic mechanical sensory receptors in the human body’s nervous system.  Their ontology involves other kinds of discernments.

Typically, the discernment between the physiological existence of body sensations and the mental existence of mental feelings is not made by human beings, though they do not exist as identical kinds of existence.  This difference can be accounted for by an analysis of the ontological implications of the following sentential meaning forming statements that can be experientially judged to be true or false by the subject of the statements.

An analysis of the ontological implications of the sentential meaning formed in S3.1. demonstrates that it refers to: (1) the mental feeling of anxiety (mental existence) in regard to; (2) the body sensation of pain (physiological existence) existing; (3) in the stomach (physical existence). 

A similar analysis of S3.2. demonstrates that it refers to: (1) the body sensation of pain (physiological existence) caused by; (2) an ulcer in the stomach (physical existence), in connection with; (3) the mental feeling of anxiety (mental existence) in regard to the body sensation of pain (physiological existence), as a body sensation that is getting worse.

Clearly, from these analyses, three different kinds of existence are being referred to by the sentential meanings that form statements S3.1. and S3.2, and, in accord with the ontology being presented, there exists correspondingly different experiences, i.e. (1) physiological existence, in this case the existence of body sensation, as being kinceptually experienced; (2) physical existence, in this case the stomach with an ulcer in it, as being sensceptually experiencable, though not sensceptually experienced by the I, i.e. by the subject of the statements, and; (3) mental existence, in this case the existence of the mental feeling of anxiety, as being emotionally experienced. 

These analyses lead to the true ontological Statement 4, as an ontological fact.

S4. Mental images are psychically experienced by imagination.

Also, typically, the discernment between the existence of mental feelings and the existence of mental images is not made, though they do not exist as identical kinds of existence.  These two kinds of mental existence can be accounted for by an analysis of the ontological implications of the following sentential meaning forming a statement that follows from S3.1. and S3.2, and, that can be experientially judged to be true or false by its subject.  The statement is:

S4.1:  The feeling of anxiety is getting worse caused by me imagining the ulcer in my stomach and imagining that it is getting worse.

An analysis of the ontological implications of the sentential meaning formed in S4.1, demonstrates that it refers to: (1) the mental feeling of anxiety getting worse   (mental existence) being caused by; (2) the mental image (mental existence) of; (3) a worsening ulcer in the stomach (physical existence).

The ontological analysis of S4.1, then, demonstrates the difference between the mental existence of mental feelings and mental images and the existence of the causal connection between the two kinds of mental existents, hence, implying the difference between the emotional experience of mental feelings, in this case the emotional experience of the mental feeling of anxiety, and the imaginational experience of mental images, in this case the imaginational experience of the mental image of a physically existing and worsening ulcer in the subject’s stomach.

The difference between these two kinds of psychically determined experiences, i.e. the emotional and imaginational experiences, of the two kinds of mental existence, i.e. mental feelings and mental images, and the sensorily determined experience, i.e. the sensceptual experience of the physical existence of the worsening ulcer in the stomach is also ontologically implied by the sentential meanings forming S4.1, so are the differences between these three kinds of experiences and what exists, and the sensorily determined experience, i.e. the kinceptual experience, of the physiological existence of body pains and pleasures, ontologically implied by S3.1. and S3.2.

S5. Mental urges are psychically experienced by conation.

What will now be conducted is an ontological analysis of sentential meanings forming an ontological statement of fact, S5.1. that follows from S3.1, S3.2, and S4.1, and that can be experientially judged to be true or false by its subject:

S5.1:  The feeling of anxiety and my imagining a worsening ulcer and its effects in my stomach causes the mental urge to go see my doctor.

An analysis of the ontological implications of the sentential meaning formed in the ontologically true statement demonstrates the existence of a mental urge to move, in this case the mental urge to move to go see a doctor, as it is caused by the composition of the mental feeling of anxiety and the mental image of a worsening ulcer and its effect in and on the subject’s stomach, hence, it implies the conational experience of the mental existence of a mental urge to move.

Again, it is not typical to discern between the conational experience of the mental existence of the mental urge to move and the kinceptual experience of the physiological existence of the body sensation of movement, however, they exist differently and are experienced differently, in that, the kinceptual experience is the direct sensory experience of the physiological existence of the sensation of body movement by proprioceptors in the nervous system of the human body, and, the conational experience is not.  The conational experience is that of the direct psychical experience of the mental existence of the mental urge to move in human consciousness, as the emotional and imaginational experiences are the direct psychical experiences of mental feelings and images in human consciousness.

S6. Mental choices are psychically experienced by volition.

The difference between mental urges and mental choice, and the difference between their corresponding different psychical experiences, again, also, are not typically discerned, whereby, these differences will be demonstrated by the ontological analysis of S6.1, another ontological statement of fact.

S6.1:  The feeling of anxiety and my imagining a worsening ulcer and its effects in my stomach causes the mental urge to go see my doctor, and, I choose to do so.

S6.1. is constructed by the conjunction of the meaning of the words ‘and, I choose to do so’ with the meanings in S5.1.  With the conjunction of these meanings, the differences between the existence: (1) of the mental feeling of anxiety, psychically experienced by emotions; (2) of the mental image of a worsening ulcer and its effect in the subject’s stomach, psychically experienced by imagination; (3) of the mental urge to move, psychically experienced by conation, and; (3) of the mental choice to move, psychically experienced by volition, are implied.

Generalizations I, II, and III:  At this point in the presentation the generalizations implied are that: (I) the volitional, conational, emotional, imaginational experiences are direct psychical experiences of mental existence, and, the kinceptual experience is direct sensory experience of physiological existence, as the sensceptual experience is direct sensory experience of physical existence, and, in even more generality; (II) the volitional, conational, emotional, and imaginational experiences are direct psychical experiences by human consciousness and the kinceptual and sensceptual experiences are direct sensory experiences by the human body, and, in further generality; (III) all of these kinds of experiences, and their corresponding kinds of existence, are synergistically, i.e. interactively and cooperatively, connected in and with the dynamic environment of a natural cosmos, along with the suppositional experience of inferring the existence of dispositional propensities.

S7. Dispositional propensities are experienced by inference.

In accord with the ontological statement of fact, S7, as the meaning of the word ‘dispositional’ is being used in it, the existence of dispositions is the existence of: (1) tendencies as body states that humans possess that they are born with, i.e. innate and un-enculturalized tendencies, and; (2) tendencies as human consciousness and body states that humans possess that are acquired after birth, i.e. non-innate and enculturalized tendencies.  The meaning of the word ‘propensity’ is used to refer to innate and un-enculturalized tendencies as body states of existence, and, the meaning of the word ‘habit’ is used to refer to non-innate and enculturalized tendencies as human consciousness and body states of existence.

The existence of the body state of a dispositional propensity, then, is the existence of a propensity that humans possess innately and un-enculturalized, e.g., the propensity of body movement.  Humans are born with their body moving, for example, with their body squirming and stretching as synergistically connected with, for example, their body breathing and digesting, and, hearing and touching.  Specifically, humans are born with their body moving in accord with it being controlled by the muscular and nervous systems, along with the skeletal, respiratory, digestive, and circulatory systems, all of which are in synergetic connection with each other and with the physical dynamics in the environment of a natural cosmos, as involving the sensceptual experience of the sensation of physical existence and the kinceptual experience of the sensation of physiological existence. 

Another propensity that a human possesses, innately and un-enculturalized, is that of the propensity to acquire the existence of human body and consciousness states as habits from body movements.  The body states of propensities to move and to acquire habits is not identical to the human body and consciousness states of habits to move and to acquire more habits, though, again, this difference is not commonly discerned.  The existence of the body state of the propensity to move and the propensities to sensceptually experience physical existence and to kinceptually experience physiological existence, along with the propensity to acquire habits, are all dispositional states that are innate and are not culturally dependent, whereas, however, the existence of habits is the existence of dispositional states that are not innate and are culturally dependent.

Propensities are the kinds of existence of body states that are not directly experienced as are: (1) the physical kinds of objects, events, and acts by the direct sensory experience of sensception; (2) physiological kinds of events by the direct sensory experience of kinception, and; (3) mental kinds of events as; (i) mental feelings by the direct psychical experience of emotions; (ii) mental images by the direct psychical experience of imagination; (iii) mental urges to move by the direct psychical experience of conation, and; (iv) mental choices by the direct psychical experience of volition, however, that which determines dispositional body states as propensities, i.e. genes, are the kind of existence, as physical objects, that are directly sensorily experiencable by sensception.

Propensities exist as body states determined by genes that exist as physical objects in a body, however, such body states as propensities are not identical to genes as physical objects in a body, and, as a directly sensceivable physical object, propensities, as body states, are not identical to the movement genes, as objects in a body,  determine.  For example the body movements of squirming, stretching, breathing, digesting, hearing, and touching, as kinds of directly sensceivable physical actions are not identical to genes, exiting as physical objects in the body as kinds of directly sensceivable physical objects.  Nor, is the body state of the propensity to directly experience physical existence sensceptually and kinceptually, identical to these experiences.

Both, propensities, existing as human body states, and habits, existing as human body and consciousness states, are indirectly experienced by inference, whereby, inference: (1) is the indirect suppositional experience of the existence of both of these kinds of dispositional states, and; (2) is an indirect suppositional experience based on the direct sensory experiences of sensception and kinception, and, direct psychical experiences of emotion, imagination, conation, and volition. and their corresponding kinds of existence.  Without these direct sensory and psychical experiences, and their corresponding kinds of existences, the indirect suppositional experiences of inference and its corresponding kind of existence could not exist.   

S8. Dispositional habits are experienced by inference.

The essential difference, not typically discerned, between the existence of propensities, as human body states, and the existence of habits, as human body and consciousness states, is that, as alluded to above, human body states, as propensities, are determined by genes, and, human body and consciousness states, as habits, are determined by enculturalization. 

Humans have no opportunity to make mental choices about what body states, as propensities, they possess innately and un-enculturalized.  For example they have no opportunity to make the mental choice to be born in a body state prohibiting the body from moving, from sensceiving and kinceiving, and from acquiring habits.  The body states of the propensities to move, to senceive and kinceive, and to acquire habits is determined by genes as physical objects in the body and, beyond mental choice.

Speaking epistemologically and contemporarily, scientific knowledge permits genes, as physical objects in the body, to be engineered, i.e. to be changed by humans, however, to change the existence of these physical objects to determine humans to be born without possessing the existence of the body states as propensities to move, to senceive and kinceive, and to acquire physical and mental habits, is to change these physical objects in a human body in such a way that beings, then, would exist, but not as human beings.

Humans, determined by the physical object kind of existence of their genes, acquire, through enculturalization, habits of human consciousness and body states, and, after the acquisition of these states, they are suppositionally experienced by humans inferring their existence with the opportunity to make mental choices about whether to keep or change their existence, i.e. to keep or change habits as human consciousness and body states.  

S9. Semiosical (meaning) existence is cognitively experienced by intellection.

Dispositional states, mental events, physiological events, and physical objects, events, and acts and their corresponding experiences of inference, emotion, imagination, conation, volition, kinception, and sensception, are synergistically connected in the environment of a natural cosmos, hence, they are interactively and interdependently significant, whereby, their significance is determined by the semiosical existence of meaning as cognitively experienced by intellection, and, as used to reference, truly or untruly, i.e. to know the kinds of existence and their corresponding kinds of experience.

The meaning of the word ‘intellection’ is used here to refer to the cognitive experience conducted as the natural act of the human intellect in and by the human mind in human consciousness, with no consideration of superiority or inferiority of the conduct.  Its meaning is used to refer to the existence of the experience of the natural act of the human intellect, with no implication of how well or ill the experience is conducted, as is implied by the meaning of the word ‘intellectual’.

Implied, however, is the kind of existence intellectionally experienced by the human mind in human consciousness, i.e. the semiosical existence of states of meaning, whereby, the meaning of the word ‘semiosical’ refers to an aspect of a serialized set of events in which and by which the existence of meaning states is involved, created, and used in the epistemologically oriented knowing process as conducted in reflective thinking experiences.

In the human consciousness, then, along with the mental existence of the events of mental feelings psychically experienced directly by emotions, of mental images psychically experienced directly by imagination, of mental urges psychically experienced by conation, and of mental choices psychically experienced directly by volition, is the semiosical existence of meaning states cognitively experienced directly by intellection, all of which are synergistically associated with each other.  The effect of this synergetic association of mental existence, as psyche, and, semiosical existence, as mind, is the existence of human awareness as the experience of the conscious existence of the conduct of reflective thinking, guided by, but not determined by, propensities of the human body and habits of the human body and human psyche and mind.

Human awareness, then, is composed of the conscious association of the mental existence of mental events in the human psyche, and, of the semiosical existence of meaning states in the human mind, whereby, through the intellectional experience, meaning states are directly cognized by intellection, and used to reference mental existence and its experience, and, to reference dispositional, physical, and physiological existences and their experiences, all of which exist externally to the human mind, but within human consciousness, of the knowing process as being conducted reflectively or unreflectively, and, as guided by the dispositional states of human body propensities, and, human body, psyche, and mind habits, within the synergetic structure of the dynamic, interactive, and cooperative environment of a natural cosmos.

Within this synergetic structure, it is only the existence of semiosical states of meanings that determine human minds in human consciousness, through the intellectional experience, to be unified with the existence of physical objects, events, and action, physiological events, mental events, and dispositional states. It is the one kind of existence that exists both: (1) internally and (2) externally to and (3) amongst human minds, i.e. that has a threefold existence, and that unifies all that exists and how all exists is experienced.

The model case of this unifying feature of the threefold existence of states of meaning is that of its unification with the external to mind physical existence of words and numerals, i.e. with the external to mind physical marks and sounds of words and numerals, as physical objects, involving, for example, both the external to mind direct sensory sensceptual experiences of seeing and hearing them, and, the internal to mind direct cognitive intellectional experience of their states of meaning.  This unification of the internal to mind semiosical existence of the meaning of words and numerals with the external to mind physical existence of marks and sounds of words and numerals is typically referred to by the meaning of the word ‘assigned’, i.e. typically, it is said that “Meaning is assigned to words and numerals,” implying that the threefold internal to mind semiosical existence of meaning is unified with the external to mind physical existence of words and numerals, hence, the intellectional experience is unified with the sensceptual experience.

The unification of the threefold semiosical existence of meaning with the physical existence of words is so strong that, typically, the discernment between the two kinds of existence and their corresponding two kinds of experience is not made.  If, however, it is made, the threefold existence of meanings of words: (1) rather than being identified with semiosical states of existence that are directly and cognitively experienced by intellection; (2) they are typically identified with mental events existing as mental feelings and images in the human consciousness that are directly and psychically experienced by emotion and imagination, as caused to exist in consciousness by the direct and sensory experiences of the human body hearing and seeing sensceptual experiences of the physical marks and sounds of words, i.e. of words as physical objects, or; (3) they are typically identified with physical actions of the human body that are directly and sensorily experienced by sensception, as caused to exist by the direct and sensory experiences of the human body hearing and seeing sensceptual experiences of the physical marks and sounds of words, i.e. of words as physical objects.

All the kinds of existences and their corresponding kinds of experiences, accounted for in the ontology presented to this point, then, are synergistically structured in the dynamic environment of a natural cosmos, with the semiosical existence of meaning, and its intellectional experience, providing for the existence of transactive human conduct, and, with the other kinds of existences, and their experiences, providing for the existence of inter-active human behavior, within the synergetic, i.e. within the natural energy driven cooperative, structure of kinds of existences and their corresponding kinds of experience.  This structure, I have chosen to refer to by the meaning of the words ‘naturalistic ontology’.

Generalizations I, II, and III Extended:  These generalizations, within a naturalistic ontology, then, can now be extended as: (I) that; (i) the intellectional experience is the mind’s experience, by apprehension and/or comprehension, of the existence of natural states, as meanings; (ii) the inferential experience is the mind’s experience of the existence of natural states, as propensities and habits; (iii) the volitional, conational, emotional, imaginational experiences are the psyche’s experiences of natural events, as mental existence; (iv) the kinceptual experience is the sensory experiences of natural events, as physiological existence, and; (v) the sensceptual experience is the sensory experience of natural objects, events, and acts, as physical existence.

In even more generality, (II) that; (i) the intellectional and inferential experiences are the mind’s experiences of the existence of natural states; (ii) the volitional, conational, emotional, and imaginational experiences are the psyche’s experiences of the existence of natural events; (iii) the kinceptual experience is the body’s sensory experiences of the existence of natural events, and; (iv) the sensceptual experience is the body’s sensory experiences of the existence of natural objects, events, and acts.

And, in further generality, (III) that all of these kinds of mind, psyche, and body experiences, and their corresponding kinds of natural existence, are synergistically, i.e. cooperatively, interactively, transactively, and interdependently, connected in and with the dynamic environment of a natural cosmos, and, are truly represented by the naturalistic ontology presented here this evening.

S10. Spiritual Existence is devoutly experienced by divination.

These generalizations in the naturalistic ontology, as presented above, does not extend to include the reference of the meaning of the words ‘spiritual existence’, however, it does extend to the reference of the meaning of the word ‘divination’, whereby, the meaning of the word ‘divination’ is used to refer to a human experience connected in and with the dynamic environment of a natural cosmos, and, the meaning of the words ‘spiritual existence’ refers to a kind of existence outside of the dynamic environment of a natural cosmos  The meaning of the words ‘spiritual existence’ is used to refer to a supernatural, not a natural, kind of existence.

Within the dynamic environment of a natural cosmos, reportedly, human beings have had experiences of spiritual existence, i.e. reportedly, humans beings have had divinationally determined devout experiences, in association with, but not as identical to, sensceptually determined sensory experiences of physical existence, kinceptually determined sensory experiences of physiological existence, emotionally determined psychical experiences of mental feelings, imaginationally determined psychial experiences of mental images, conationally determined psychical experiences of mental urges, volitionally determined psychial experience of mental choices, inferentially determined cognitive experiences of dispositional propensities, inferentially determined suppositional experiences of dispositional habits, and intellectionally determined cognitive experiences of semiosical meaning.

Within a naturalistic ontology, a set of ontologically true statements have been presented that have been used to demonstrate an account of a true philosophy of existence and a true philosophy of experience of existence, i.e. a true ontology, on which a true metaphysics, can be founded, within which, a true epistemology can be integrated along with a true logic of the conduct of reflective thinking experiences.  Such a founding and integration of a true ontology, true metaphysics, true epistemology, and true logic is the bases for a true ethics and a true aesthetics, and for a true philosophy of educology for developing democracies in the world.

I will end by saying that the true naturalistic ontology presented, as the basis for a true metaphysics, epistemology, logic, ethics, aesthetics, and philosophy of educology should be conceived as a theory composed of ten empirical hypotheses to be tested by each of you when experiencing philosophy, whereby, experiencing philosophy is not that of experiencing a presentation of refinements from my experience, but as the philosophically oriented cooperative conduct of your and my reflective thinking experiences of what exists in nature.

I invite you, to join with me, to follow the mental urge to conduct the experience of philosophy as an experiment in life in which a naturalistic ontological theory is being tested for truth.

I have been doing this kind of experiment in life for over thirty years, now, and, though my body and mind habits of conducting reflective thinking experiences, oriented by the philosophical problems of what exists, what is reality, what is knowledge, what is logic of knowledge, what is the good, and what is the beautiful, are flexible, comprehensive, and penetrating, they are also well formed by the conduct of reflective thinking experiences oriented by the most important philosophical problem in developing democracies in the world as that of what is knowledge about education, i.e. what is educology?

May I pour wine for anyone?  Let us begin experiencing philosophy, as experiencing the pursuit of ontological truth within the love of wisdom, by experiencing the existence of the physical substance in which truth exists. 

Experiencing the physical substance of hemlock, however, I mentally choose to prohibit, and, I continue to conduct myself with this choice.  My experiencing of the imagination of the mental image of my physical body being physically dead and the associated emotion of the mental feeling of fear and the conation of the mental urge to move myself away from such physical substances all connect to make this choice and to continue the conduct of moving away from hemlock.