A General Sketch of a Semiotically Understood and Oriented Organic Experiential Philosophy of Educology for Developing Democracies in the World

James E. Fisher
Educology Research Associates
Columbia, South Carolina

Abstract

The argument is developed to support the philosophy that inquirers in and about educology must seek and teach knowledge about the semiositally understood and oriented organic connection of education and experience. It follows the philosophy that knowledge is the resolution of the uncertainty about something and John Dewey’s assumption in regard to uncertainty about, i.e. in regard to the lack of knowledge about, the connection between experience and education, when he says that:

I assume that amid all uncertainty there is one permanent frame of reference: namely, the organic connection between education and personal experience. . . (1)

Structure of Beliefs Underlying the Argument

Firstly, from the perspective of democracy as a way of life, the argument is set in the structure of historical belief that the USA is a developing, and not a completed, democracy in the World.

Secondly, the general structure of philosophical belief is that provided by the work in early 20th century Western World oriented philosophy by Charles Peirce and John
Dewey and in later 20th century by Umberto Eco. Essentially, the structure of philosophical belief is that of including the importance of meaning as the cultural unit of a semantical fact, understood by Peirce and Eco, as involved in and produced by the semiosical process and studied in semiotics, wherein the semiosical process significantly orients the organic connection of education and experience, implicating educology, particularly implicated as knowledge about how to conduct reflective thinking experience as the means to continuous and worthwhile growth of humans, as individuals and as members of a group, i.e. as members in associated living situations. Part I is sketched within this general structure.

Thirdly, the specific structure of philosophical belief is that provided by the author’s work in Pedagogika, 51, 2001, published by Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas, Lithuania, titled “An Outlined Introduction to the Universal and Unifying Experiential Research Methodology in the Domain of Educology;” and by Ronald McLaren’s work in Solving Moral Problems, published by Mayfield Publishing Company, California, USA. Part II is sketched within this specific structure.

**Part I: Democracy**

**Democracy as a Form of Government.** The meaning of the word ‘democracy’, as found in the statements in the theme, is used to reference two basic forms of government in which the supreme power is vested in an association of individual humans, as a group of people, by which: (1) the supreme power is exercised directly by the people’s vote on issues affecting themselves, through their own vote under a free electoral system; and (2) the supreme power is exercised indirectly by the people’s vote on issues affecting
themselves, through their elected representatives under a free electoral system. The latter form is properly referred to by the meaning of the word ‘republic’, however, for the purpose of this paper the meaning of the word ‘democracy’ will be used to reference both forms of government.

**Democracy as a Way of Life.** There is another and penetrating meaning of the word ‘democracy’ that is also used referentially, for as Dewey states:

A democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience. (2)

The meaning of the phrase “democracy as a way of life,” then, from the structure of beliefs underpinning the theme, refers to a mode of associated life that involves conjointly communicative experiences.

As implied by the meaning of the statements in the theme and Dewey’s statement, there are two questions to be answered, in this paper. They are as follows:

Question 1. “How is democracy, as a way of life, conducted as a mode of associated living, involving conjointly communicated experiences?”

Question 2. “How is the democratically experienced and conducted way of life related to the educative experience?”

**Democracy, as a Way of Life, and Communication.** From the conceptual stance that those who conduct philosophical inquiry within and/or about educology, i.e. the conduct of philosophers of educology, as participants in democracy as a way of life, must seek and teach semiotical knowledge, i.e. knowledge about the semiotically understood and oriented organic connection of education and experience, Question 1 asks for an answer, first. Before this question can be answered, however, the reference of the
meaning of the phrase “semiotically understood and oriented organic connection of education and experience,” must be made significant.

To identify this significance, it is imperative, first, to understand that the meaning of the word ‘semiosis’, as it refers to the process known in semiotics, and as developed by Peirce in *Pragmatism in Retrospect: A Last Formulation*, found as a chapter in Justus Buchler’s edition of *Philosophical Writings of Peirce*, refers to two humanly conducted processes that exist as modes of associated living so that conjointly communicative experiences can be understood and participated in. The two semiosical processes, as known in semiotics, are (1) the significative process and (2) the informative process, the difference between which is made by Eco in Section 1.4. “Information. communication, signification,” in his book *A Theory of Semiotics*.

For a conjointly communicated experience to be conducted in a humanly associated way of life, referred to by the meaning of the word ‘democracy’, then, in accord with, Peirce’s and Eco’s perspective semiotics, i.e. knowledge about the semiosical process, both the significative and informative aspects of the communicative experience must be understood and oriented by involved humans.

The meaning of the word ‘democracy’, used to refer to a way of life, by its very existence, according to Dewey, is related to the communicated experience, however, especially, according to Eco, the reference of the meaning of the word ‘communication’ must not include that of the informative aspect of the semiosical process, at the exclusion of the significative aspect of the semiosical process. Effective orientation in a communicative process, especially as humanly conducted in a democracy as a way of
life, necessarily involves an obligation of citizens, including, especially educologists, to semotically understand the difference between, and the orientation of, the significative and informative semiosical aspects in communication.

**The Significative and Informative Semiosical Aspects of Communication.** According to semiotics, semiosis relates meaning, in the significative aspects, and data, in the informative aspects, as they both are understood and oriented in the communicative process.

Meaning, as involved in the significative aspect, and data, as involved in the informative aspect, can begin to be semiotically discerned and understood when the distinction between the meanings of the words ‘sign’ and ‘signal’ is considered as made by understanding the difference between a sign *standing-for* meaning being transacted in an association and that of a signal *stimulating or giving rise to* data being transmitted in an association. This difference is demonstrated in the following account of an information process transmitting data in an association between two mechanical devices, and of a signification process transacting meaning in an association between a mechanical device and a human being. In making this account, Eco says:

When a floating buoy signals to the control panel of an automobile the level reached by the gasoline, this process occurs entirely by means of a mechanical chain of causes and effects.

Nevertheless, according to the principles of information theory, there is an ‘informational’ process that is in some way considered a communicational process too. Our example does not consider what happens once the signal (from the buoy) reaches the control panel and is converted into a visible measuring device (a red moving line or an oscillating arm): this is an undoubted case of sign-process in which the position of the arm stands for the level of the gasoline .... (3)
Eco’s account provides for a semiotical demonstration of: (1) the association between mechanical devices and (2) the association between a mechanical device and a human being, in the process of semiosis.

In regard to the association between the mechanical devices, the association is that of the physical device of a floating buoy in a gasoline tank of an automobile and the physical device of a red moving line or oscillating arm on the control panel of that automobile. The account of this association demonstrates the fact that according to contemporary information theory, it is appropriate to use the meaning of the word ‘signal’, which shall be extended to the words ‘signal-process’, to refer to the set of stimulus-response events that occur as data transmitted from one mechanical device to another.

In regard to the association between the mechanical device and a human being, the association is that between the red moving line or oscillating arm, as physical devices on the control panel of an automobile, and the physiological organs of the eyes of a human being looking at, i.e. observing, the control panel, wherein, it is a matter of fact that the signal-process of a series of stimulus and response events, as data, is transmitted to the control panel, it is also a matter of fact that the signal-process is, as Eco says, “converted into a visible measuring device (a red moving line or an oscillating arm)” wherein, the conversion is an undoubted case of a sign-process in which the position of the oscillating arm or red moving line stands-for the level of the gasoline in the tank.

A Semiotic Demonstration of the Two Semiosical Aspects and the Two Types of Association in Communication. Eco’s account provides for a semiotic demonstration of the physical fact of a stimulus-response
type of association, involving a signal-process in the informative aspect of communication by the transmission of data between mechanical devices, and of the semantical fact of a standing-for type of association, involving a sign-process in the significative aspect of communication by the transaction of meaning between mechanical devices and human beings.

In regard to the physical fact, a buoy in the gasoline tank of a car and an oscillating arm or red moving line on the control panel of that car are examples of mechanical devices, as physical existents, that are in communication with each other through a stimulus-response type of association. Also, a keyboard of a computer and a monitor of a computer are physical existents, where computers are commonly referred to by the meaning of the words ‘electronic devices’, in contrast to being referenced by the meaning of the words ‘mechanical devices’. A computer keyboard and monitor are in communication with each other through a stimulus-response type of association resulting in a blinking bar or light. The physical existents of mechanical and electronic devices, then, can and do communicate within themselves, and with each other, through a stimulus-response type of association.

Further, the physical facts, with the development of understanding of the nervous system of animals, including human beings, the organs of human bodies, for example, can be referred to by the meaning of the words ‘organic devices’ to contrast them with the kind of physical existent referenced by the meanings of the words ‘mechanical devices’ and ‘electronic devices’. This understanding provides the meaning of the words ‘organic devices’ to refer to the organs of sensations, i.e. the eyes, ears, nose, skin, and tongue, as they are in a stimulus-response type of association with the organic device of the brain resulting in
impulse events between neurons in the nervous system of the human body.

So, mechanical devices, like buoys in gasoline tanks in cars and oscillating arms or red moving lines on control panels of cars; electronic devices, like keyboards of computers and blinking bars and lights on monitors of computers; and organic devices, like eyes, ears, noses, skin, tongues, and brains of humans and impulse connections between neurons in the nervous system of humans; all, are physical existents that communicate within themselves, and with other physical existents, by means of a stimulus-response type of association, through data transmission in the informative aspect of semiosis in the communication process.

In regard to the semantical fact, it is worthwhile, here, for meaning interpretation, to return to Eco’s consideration of the informative and significative aspects of semiosis, where he alludes to what is puzzling for semiotic theory, i.e. to what is puzzling for the kind of theory intended to constitute knowledge about both aspects of semiosis in the communication process.

In regard to the moment that the human being looks at the mechanical device of the oscillating arm or red moving line on the control panel of the car, as a pointer, Eco says:

...what is puzzling for a semiotic theory is the process which takes place before a human being looks at the pointer: although at the moment when he does so the pointer is the starting point of a signification process, before that moment it is only the final result of a preceding communication process. During this process we cannot say that the position of the buoy stands for the movement of the pointer: instead of ‘standing-for’, the buoy stimulates, provides, causes, gives rise to the movement of the pointer. (4)

The meaning to be interpreted, from this consideration of Eco’s, is that of the word ‘pointer’. As used in the quote, the meaning of the word ‘pointer’ refers to the mechanical
device of the oscillating arm or red moving line on the control panel of the car, thusly, establishing a semantical fact. A mechanical device, in this case as a result of the physical fact of a stimulus-response type of association, involving the signal-process in a transmission of data, by referencing it with the meaning of the word ‘pointer’, becomes *endowed with meaning* and thereby establishing a semantical fact functioning for the conduct of transactions involving the sign-process in a standing-for type of association.

**The Importance of the Standing-For Type of Association in Communication:** It is the standing-for type of association in a transaction of meaning that is important in its necessity for the semiotical understanding of the experiential orientation toward the informative and significative semiosical aspects of the communicative experience within and between humans and physical existents, like mechanical, electrical, and organic devices, and within and between humans.

This necessity, i.e. the necessity for a standing-for type of association, involving transacted meaning in the semiotical understanding of the experiential orientation toward the significative and informative aspects of the communicated experience, is one that mechanical, electronic, and organic devices, and their stimulus-response type of association, involving data transmissions within and among themselves, as-and-only-as physical existents, in the informative aspect of communication, can and do meet.

Though transacted meaning, as a semantical fact, can and is endowed on the physical existence of their devices, as, and involving, the data of information, their physical existence, as involved in only the stimulus-response type of association, is limited to-and-only-to, that type of
association. They, in their existence, and in their existence only, exist without transacted meaning endowed on them, i.e. they exist meaninglessly. They, in themselves, stand-for nothing, though they, in themselves, can and do stimulate responses.

The mechanical device, of the buoy in the gasoline tank of the car, as-and-only-as a physical existent, stimulates responses that result, as the data of information, in the form of an oscillating arm or red moving line on the control panel of the car. However, without the existence of meaning, as expressed, for example, by the word ‘pointer’, used to refer to its function as an indicator of the quantity of gasoline in the gasoline tank, hence, endowing it with meaning, the existence of the mechanical device as-and-only-as an oscillating arm or red moving line, itself, though being actual, i.e. existing in physical actuality, would be meaningless, i.e. would exist without meaning, hence, standing-for nothing, though stimulating responses.

Such an existence, as-and-only-as a physical existent, is one that is semiosically related by the stimulus-response type of association, and not the standing-for type of association, in communication.

Also, the electronic device of a keyboard of a computer stimulates responses that result as the data of information in the form of a blinking bar or light on the monitor of the computer. However, without the existence of transacted meaning, as expressed, for example, by the word ‘cursor’ used to refer to its function as an indicator of a location from which to begin word processing, hence, endowing it with meaning, it, the blinking bar or light, would not be endowed with meaning, hence, it would exist in-and-only-in physical actuality, but, without meaning, therefore, standing-for nothing, though actually stimulating responses.

And, again, such an existence, as-and-only-as a physical
existent, is one that is semiosically related by the stimulus-response type of association, and not the standing-for type of association, in communication.

Further, the organic devices of the eyes, ears, nose, skin, tongue, and brain of humans stimulate responses that result as the data of information in the form of impulse events between neurons of the human nervous system. However, without the existence of the transacted meaning, as expressed, for example, by the word ‘synapse’ used to refer to its function as an indicator of a connection between neurons, hence, endowing it with meaning, it, the physical impulse event, would not be endowed with meaning, therefore, it would exist in-and-only-in physical actuality, without meaning, and again, standing-for nothing, though stimulating responses.

And, once again, such an existence, as-and-only-as a physical existent, is one that is semiosically related by the stimulus-response type of association, and not the standing-for type of association, in communication.

The data of mechanical, electronic, and organic communicative devices, as-and-only-as physical existents, then, respectively, can be referred to by transacted meaning, endowing them with it, and, therefore, transforming them, or as Eco says, converting them, from signals, in the signal-process of data transmissions in the stimulus-response type of association, to signs, in the sign-process of meaning transactions in the standing-for type of association.

Through this transformation of signals, in the signal-process of transmitting data, to signs, in the sign-process of transacting meaning, the data of mechanical, electronic, and organic communicative devices, being referred to by the use of meaning, e.g. the meanings of the words ‘pointer’, ‘cursor’, and ‘synapse’, exist differently, then, not as-and-only-as physical existents, but as physical existents endowed
with and enveloped by meaning, hence, existing as semiosically encompassed physical existents. And, existing as semiosically encompassed physical existents, they can be semiotically understood, for experiential orientation toward them, to function in both the stimulus-response and standing-for types of semiosical associations in communication. This difference of existence, i.e. existing not-as-only physical existents, but also existing as physical existents endowed with and enveloped and encompassed by meaning, is a difference that makes a difference.

The difference, that makes a difference, is that physical existents become signalized transmitted data enveloped by signified transactive meaning causing them to both stimulate responses and stand-for something, making mechanical, electronic, and organic physical existence significant, hence, important. The existence of the encompassing meaning, that envelopes them, causes them to stand-for something, and their existence as physical data causes them to stimulate a response of something.

The physical devices of mechanical, electronic, and human organic existence, then, associate within and between themselves, by the stimulus-response of physical data in the informative aspect of semiosis, and, also, they associate by standing-for meaning in the significative aspect of semiosis, making communication within and between humans possible, hence, the importance of the standing-for type of association in communication.

The use of transacted meaning to reference the physical data of mechanical, electronic, and organic existents, though successful at the endowment, envelopment, and encompassment of physical data with meaning, it is not successful at the endowment, envelopment and encompassment and the penetration and impregnation of physical data with meaning.
The physical data: of the mechanical devices of cars, for example; of the electronic devices of computers, for example; and of the organic devices of humans, for example; can be semiosically understood to be experientially oriented toward being enveloped and encompassed by meaning and therefore, be caused to stand-for meaning. However, the physical data of these physical devices can not be semiosically understood to be experientially oriented toward being penetrated and impregnated with meaning, and, therefore, be caused to stand-for meaning and to understand the meaning being stood-for.

The Stimulus-Response and the Standing-For Two Types and the Understanding of the Meaning Being Stood-For, as the Third Type of Semiosical Association in Communication: A buoy in the gasoline tank of a car and the oscillating arm or red moving arm on the control panel of the car, along with the stimulus-response data of information involved in their association, all can be semiotically understood for experiential orientation toward their being referentially endowed with meaning that envelopes and encompasses them, therefore, being in communication with humans by the two standing-for and stimulus-response types of association in semiosis.

However, because they are mechanical physical existents, and not organic physical existents, they can not be semiosically understood for experiential orientation toward them by their being referentially endowed with meaning that envelopes and encompasses and that penetrates and impregnates them with meaning, therefore, being associated by both the stimulus-response type and the standing-for type of association in semiosis, and also by the understanding of the meaning being stood-for third type of association in
semiosis. Mechanical devices of cars, though, they can communicate with each other through the stimulus-response type of association and with humans through the stimulus-response type and the standing-for type of associations, they can not communicate with each other or humans through their understanding of the meaning being stood-for type of association.

Cars can not semiotically understand the meaning that cars, as physical existents, stand-for, nor the meaning that the word ‘cars’ stands-for.

Also, because electronic devices, like computers, are physical existents that are not organic physical existents, they can not be semiosically understood for experiential orientation toward them to be associated by the two stimulus-response and standing-for types of association and also by the understanding of the meaning being stood-for third type of association in semiosis.

Computers can not semiotically understand the meaning that computers, as physical existents, stand-for, nor the meaning that the word ‘computer’ stands-for.

In contrast to the mechanical and electronic devices, for examples, cars and computers, the organic devices of, for example, the organ of the brain of a human body and the organs of sensations, i.e. the eyes, ears, nose, skin, and tongue of the human body, can be semiotically understood for experiential orientation toward them to be associated by the two stimulus-response and standing-for types of association and also by the semiotical understanding of the meaning being stood-for third type of association in semiosis, because of the organic stimulus-response type of association between:

1. the organic physical existent of the organs of the human body, including, especially, the human brain and the physical existent of the organs of sensation resulting in impulse events between
neurons in the nervous system of the human body, and;

(2) the organic psychical existents of the events and states of the human mind, e.g. those resulting in the mental feelings of emotions, the mental images of imagination, and the mental will of volition, and of the state of the human mind resulting in dispositional habits of propensities of humans;

Whereas, the organic physical and psychical existents are connected by the organic stimulus-response type of association, the organic physical existent of the impulse event between neurons in the nervous system of the human body, for example, can exist as-and-only-as a physical existent without the meaning of, for example, the word 'synapse' to reference and endow it with meaning that envelopes and encompasses it, so can the organic psychical existents in the human mind:

(1) of the mental feelings of emotions exist as-and-only-as an organic psychical existent without the meanings of, for example, the words 'joy and sadness' and 'love and hate' to reference and endow them with meaning that envelopes and encompasses them;

(2) of the mental images of imagination exist as-and-only-as an organic psychical existent without the meanings of, for example, the words 'representation', 'vision', 'dream', or 'hallucination' to reference and endow them with meaning that envelopes and encompasses them;

(3) of the mental will of volition exist as-and-only-as an organic psychical existent without the meanings of, for example, the words 'resolve', 'determination', or 'strength of mind' to reference and endow them with meaning that envelopes and encompasses them, and;

(4) of the mental habits of disposition exist as-and-only-as an organic psychical existent without the meanings of, for example, the words 'attitude', 'inclination', 'tendency', or 'proclivity' to reference and endow them with meaning that envelopes and encompasses them.

Whereas, the organic physical and psychical existents
are connected by the organic stimulus-response type of association, the organic physical existent of the impulse event between neurons in the nervous system of the human body, for example, can not be penetrated and impregnated by the meaning that envelopes and encompasses it, as endowed, for example, by the reference of the word ‘synapse’. However, in the human mind:

(1) the organic psychical mental events, being referenced and endowed by the use of the meanings, for example, of the words ‘joy and sadness’ and ‘love and hate’ can be penetrated and impregnated by the meanings that envelopes and encompasses them;

(2) the organic psychical mental events, being referenced and endowed by the use of the meanings, for example, of the words ‘representation’, ‘vision’, ‘dream’, or ‘hallucination’ can be penetrated and impregnated by the meanings that envelopes and encompasses them;

(3) the organic psychical mental events, being referenced and endowed by the use of the meanings, for example, of the words ‘resolve’, ‘determination’, or ‘strength of mind’ can be penetrated and impregnated by the meanings that envelopes and encompasses them, and;

(4) the organic psychical dispositional state, being referenced and endowed by the use of the meanings, for example, of the words ‘attitude’, ‘inclination’, ‘tendency’, or ‘proclivity’ can be penetrated and impregnated by the meanings that envelopes and encompasses them.

Also, though, whereas, the meaning of the word ‘synapse’, can be used to reference a physical existent, therefore, stand for a physical existent that can exist as-and-only-as a physical existent, so:

(1) the meanings of the words ‘joy and sadness’ and ‘love and hate’ can be used to reference psychical existents, therefore, stand-for those psychical existents that can exist as-and-only-as psychical existents;

(2) the meanings of the words ‘representation’, ‘vision’,
‘dream’, or ‘hallucination’ can be used to reference psychical existents, therefore, stand-for those psychical existents that can exist as-and-only-as psychical existents;

(3) the meanings of the words ‘resolve’, ‘determination’, or ‘strength of mind’ can be used to reference psychical existents, therefore, stand-for those psychical existents that can exist as-and-only-as psychical existents, and;

(4) the meanings of the words ‘attitude’, ‘inclination’, ‘tendency’, or ‘prclivity’ can be used to reference psychical existents, therefore, stand-for those psychical existents that can exist as-and-only-as psychical existents.

Therefore, whereas, organic physical and psychical existents of the human body and mind can exist as-and-only-as organic physical and psychical existents, connected in the stimulus-response type of association, they can also exist:

(1) as organic physical-psychical data, being connected in the organic stimulus-response type of association; and

(2) as organic physical-psychical connected data, being stood-for by meaning, used to reference, endow, envelope, and encompass it, in the standing-for type of association;

and, because of the organic physical-psychical connected data, as being involved in the organic stimulus-response type of association and in the standing-for meaning type of association,

(3) as understanding of the meaning being stood-for type of association.

Humans, as organic physical-psychical beings, can understand what the meaning of their own organic physical-psychical existence stands-for, hence, the meaning of what they stand for, as well as the meaning of what other things, especially words, stand for.

Humans can conduct themselves with this semiotical understanding for experiential orientation toward and with
meaning as they, as organic-physical-psychical-semiosical beings, communicatively experience:

1. the stimulus-response of data in the informative type of association;
2. the standing-for of meaning in the significative type of association; and
3. the understanding of the meaning being stood-for in the experience of the informative and significative types of association.

In short, then, humans can, through semiotical understanding, understand that what they say and do has meaning and what the meaning of what they say and do has in their associated living, i.e. in their stimulus-response, standing-for, and understanding of meaning types of associations, as conducted conjointly, i.e. as conducted with other humans, in communicated experience. Hence, Question 1 can be answered as follows.

An Answer to Question 1. Question 1: “How is democracy, as a way of life, conducted as a mode of associated living, involving conjointly communicated experiences?”

With the meaning developed in Part I, the answer is as follows.

Answer 1: “By semiosis is how democracy, as a way of life, is conducted as a mode of associated living, involving conjointly communicated experiences.”

where the meaning of the word ‘semiosis’ is used to refer to the organic process:

1. that characterizes the essential aspects involved in human communication;
   (a) in which physical and physical-psychical existence, as the data of information in the stimulus-response type of association is semiotically understood within the stimulus-response type of associated living situations to
stimulate human organic conjointly communicated experiences; and,

(b) through which the existence of meaning is semiotically understood and used to reference and endow the existence of physical mechanical and electronic and the physical-psychical organic data in the standing-for type of association and the transmission of data in the stimulus-response type of association, within and between stimulated human organic conjointly communicated experiences;

(2) that provides for the envelopment and encompassment by meaning of physical mechanical and electronic and of organic physical-psychical existence as data of information transmission in communication, for semiotical understanding and experiential orientation in associated living situations by the understanding of the meaning being stood for type of association, within and between stimulated human organic conjointly communicated experiences;

(3) that provides for the penetration and impregnation by meaning of organic physical-psychical existence as data of information transmission in communication, for semiotical understanding and experiential orientation in associated living situations by the understanding of the meaning being stood for type of association, within and between stimulated human organic conjointly communicated experiences;

(4) by which humans, as organic physical-psychical existents, can conduct associated and communicated living experiences, with semiotical understanding and experiential orientation toward the association between data and meaning by the semiotical understanding of the meaning being stood for type of association, within and between stimulated human organic conjointly communicated experiences.
Part I Summary. The meaning of the word ‘democracy’ can be used to refer to a form of government and to a way of life. In Part I, the focus has been its meaning that references a way of life, specifically as a way of life involving communication.

Sketched in Part I has been the meaning of the word ‘communication’ that refers to the two significative and informative semiosical aspects of communication and the two stimulus-response and standing-for semiosical types of association in communication, with importance of the standing-for meaning semiosical type of association emphasized in relation to the stimulus-response of data semiosical type of association through the semiotical understanding of the meaning being stood-for, third type of association.

It is through the third type of association, i.e. the understanding of the meaning being stood-for semiosical type of association, by which the semiotical understanding and orientation of the organic experiential philosophy of educology for developing democracies, as developing ways of life, in the world is derived.

Part II

Philosophy of Educology and Democracy

Where philosophy of educology is the philosophical study of knowledge about education, it is the semiotical understanding of and orientation toward stimulus-response associated human organic communicated experiences in standing-for associated living relationships, as a democratically experienced and conducted way of life, that provides an awareness of the knowledge about the organic connection between experience and education, to be accounted for in Part II, in which
Question 2: “How is the democratically experienced and conducted way of life related to the educative experience?” will be answered as follows.

Answer 2: “By semiotical understanding of and orientation in the phases of the reflective thinking experience is how the democratically experienced and conducted way of life relates to the educative experience.”

In An Outlined Introduction to the Universal and Unifying Research Methodology in the Domain of Educology, as published in Pedagogika, 51, 2001, Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas, Lithuania, and in the International Journal of Educology, (IJE) 1998-2001, Volume 12-15, Educology Research Associates, Sydney, eleven phases in the reflective thinking experience were distinguished and outlined through the semiotical understanding of the difference between the stimulus-response of data type of associations and the standing-for meaning type of associations when considered in the reflective thinking experience.

With this semiotical understanding, then, the difference between physical and psychical data and the organically related semiosical meaning in the reflective thinking experience can be made:

(1) where physical data are exampled by what is sensed by and involved in the stimulus-response of data type of associations by the nervous system of a human body;

(2) where psychical data are exampled by what are sensed by and involved in the stimulus-response of data type of associations in the reflective thinking phases of a human mind; and

(3) where semiosical meaning is exampled by what is intellectualized by and involved in the standing-for of meaning type of associations in the reflective thinking phases of a human mind.

And, with semiotical understanding, then:
(1) Examples of physical data sensed by the nervous system of a human body are physical objects like atoms, molecules, stars, cars, and mountains and physical behaviors like running, falling, and jumping;

(2) Examples of physical objects involved within the nervous system of a human body are neurons and of physical behaviors are synapses;

(3) Examples of psychical data sensed in the reflective thinking phases of a human mind are: mental feelings of emotion like wonder, joy, frustration, and resentment; mental images of imagination like visions, dreams, representations, and hallucinations; mental willing of volition like determination, resolve, and will power; and habits of disposition like inclinations, tendencies, and attitudes; and

(4) Examples of semiotical meanings intellectualized in the reflective thinking phases of a human mind are the meanings; (i) used to refer to and endow physical data and envelope and encompass them, and (ii) used to refer to and endow psychical data and envelope and encompass them, and also to penetrate and impregnate them.

A semiotically understood and oriented experiential philosophy of educology as a philosophy of the reflective thinking experience, emphasizing the interrelatedness of the sense experiences involved in a stimulus-response of data type of semiosical association and the intellectual experiences involved in the standing-for meaning type of semiosical association, as a philosophy of democracy as a way of life, then, can begun to be established as follows.

A Semiotically Understood and Oriented Experiential Philosophy of Educology as a Democratic Philosophy of Life. Where educology means knowledge about education and education means, as Dewey states it:
that reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning of experience, and which increases ability to direct the course of subsequent experience; (5) then, philosophy of educology means philosophy of knowledge about how to reconstruct or reorganize experience in which transacted meaning is organic to experience and is added into experience, and in which this added meaning of experience contributes to the ability to direct the course of subsequent experience toward further growth in the ability to direct the course of subsequent experience, etc, for as Dewey also says:

there is nothing to which growth is relative save more growth, there is nothing to which education is subordinate save more education. It is a commonplace to say that education should not cease when one leaves school. The point of this commonplace is that the purpose of school education is to insure the continuance of education by organizing the powers that insure growth. The inclination to learn from life itself and to make the conditions of life such that all will learn in the process of living is the finest product of schooling. (6)

It should be pointed out that the meaning of the word ‘education’, as used in this quote is that which refers to the educative experience as conducted through the phases of reflective thinking experience. The meaning of the words ‘human growth’, then, refers to the educative experience as conducted through the phases of reflective thinking, hence, educology becomes knowledge about human growth, i.e. educology becomes knowledge about the human conduct of the phases of the reflective thinking experiences, as transacted meaning, i.e. as the semiosical existent known to semiotics, is organic to it and added within and by it. Philosophy of educology, then, becomes the philosophy of knowledge, i.e. the epistemology of how to continuously transact and add meaning to life’s experiences.
As Dewey states, meaning is that which increases a human’s ability to direct the course of his/her subsequent experience, hence, is vital, i.e. is organic, to the reflective thinking experience, hence, is organic, i.e. is vital, to education, i.e. is organic or vital to the educative experience. Therefore, when he states his educology of schools as the “purpose of school education is to insure the continuance of education by organizing the powers that insure growth,” he is referring to the organization of what is semiotically understood to be the:

1. the experience of the sensation of physical data organically, i.e. vitally, involved in the stimulus-response transmission of data type of associations by the nervous system of a human body;
2. the experience of the sensation of psychical data organically, i.e. vitally, involved in the stimulus-response transmission of data type of associations in the reflective thinking phases of a human mind; and
3. the experience of intellectualization of the semiosical meaning organically, i.e. vitally, involved in the standing-for transaction of meaning type of associations in the reflective thinking phases of a human mind.

The sensations of the human body involve natural and powerful stimulus-responses to move. Especially in school age children is this natural power prevalent. School age children’s bodies urge them to physically move, i.e. to squirm, to run, to jump, to skip, and to laugh, as examples. The sensations of the mind in school age children also involve the natural and powerful stimulus-responses to mentally move. The mental urges to move, for example the urge by the feelings of anxiety and wonder, anger and joy, appreciation and resentment, and happiness and sadness are stimulus-response associated with each other and with the bodily urges to move, especially in school age children.
These body and mental urges to move, i.e. these affections as data, when considering how to organize them for school educative experiences, then, become experiences that can conflict with the intellectual experience of meaning, i.e. the cognition of meaning, and it is this dualism between the human experiences of affection and cognition, i.e. between the human mind and body experiences, that is the focus of the following rather long quote by Dewey in which he implicitly is working with the semiotically understood distinctions between the experiences of the sensations of physical data involved in the nervous system of the human body and the experiences of the sensations of mental data and the intellectualizations of semiosical meanings involved in the reflective thinking phases of the human mind. In this regard, Dewey says:

It would be impossible to state adequately the evil results which have flowed from this dualism of mind and body, much less to exaggerate them. Some of the more striking effects, may, however, be enumerated.

(a) In part bodily activity becomes an intruder. Having nothing, so it is thought, to do with mental activity, it becomes a distraction, an evil to be contended with. For the pupil has a body, and brings it to school along with his mind. And the body is, of necessity, a wellspring of energy; it has to do something. But its activities, not being utilized in occupation with things which yield significant results, have to be frowned upon. They lead the pupil away from the lesson with which his "mind" ought to be occupied; they are sources of mischief. The chief source of the "problem of discipline" in schools is that the teacher has often to spend the larger part of the time in suppressing the bodily activities which take the mind away from its material. A premium is put on physical quietude; on silence, on rigid uniformity of posture and movement; upon a machine-like simulation of the attitudes of intelligent interest. The teachers' business is to hold the pupils up to these requirements and to punish the inevitable deviations which occur.

The nervous strain and fatigue which result with both teacher and pupil are a necessary consequence of the abnormality of the
situation in which bodily activity is divorced from the perception of meaning. Callous indifference and explosions from strain alternate. The neglected body, having no organized fruitful channels of activity, breaks forth, without knowing why or how, into meaningless boisterousness, or settles into equally meaningless fooling -- both very different from the normal play of children. Physically active children become restless and unruly; the more quiescent, so called conscientious ones spend what energy they have in the negative task of keeping their instincts and active tendencies suppressed, instead of in a positive one of constructive planning and execution; they are thus educated not into responsibility for the significant and graceful use of bodily powers, but into an enforced duty not to give them free play. It may be seriously asserted that a chief cause for the remarkable achievements of Greek education was that it was never misled by false notions into an attempted separation of mind and body.

Even, however, with respect to the lessons which have to be learned by the application of "mind," some bodily activities have to be used. The senses -- especially the eye and ear -- have to be employed to take in what the book, the map, the blackboard, and the teacher say. The lips and vocal organs, and the hands, have to be used to reproduce in speech and writing what has been stowed away. The senses are then regarded as a kind of mysterious conduit through which information is conducted from the external world into the mind; they are spoken of as gateways and avenues of knowledge. To keep the eyes on the book and the ears open to the teacher's words is a mysterious source of intellectual grace. Moreover, reading, writing, and figuring -- important school arts -- demand muscular or motor training. The muscles of eye, hand, and vocal organs accordingly have to be trained to act as pipes for carrying knowledge back out of the mind into external action. For it happens that using the muscles repeatedly in the same way fixes in them an automatic tendency to repeat.

The obvious result is a mechanical use of the bodily activities which (in spite of the generally obtrusive and interfering character of the body in mental action) have to be employed more or less. For the senses and muscles are used not as organic participants in having an instructive experience, but as external inlets and outlets of mind. Before the child goes to school, he learns with his hand, eye, and ear, because they are organs of the process of doing something
from which meaning results. The boy flying a kite has to keep his eye on the kite, and has to note the various pressures of the string on his hand. His senses are avenues of knowledge not because external facts are somehow "conveyed" to the brain, but because they are used in doing something with a purpose. The qualities of seen and touched things have a bearing on what is done, and are alertly perceived; they have a meaning. But when pupils are expected to use their eyes to note the form of words, irrespective of their meaning, in order to reproduce them in spelling or reading, the resulting training is simply of isolated sense organs and muscles. It is such isolation of an act from a purpose which makes it mechanical. It is customary for teachers to urge children to read with expression, so as to bring out the meaning. But if they originally learned the sensory-motor technique of reading -- the ability to identify forms and to reproduce the sounds they stand for -- by methods which did not call for attention to meaning, a mechanical habit was established which makes it difficult to read subsequently with intelligence. The vocal organs have been trained to go their own way automatically in isolation; and meaning cannot be tied on at will. Drawing, singing, and writing may be taught in the same mechanical way; for, we repeat, any way is mechanical which narrows down the bodily activity so that a separation of body from mind -- that is, from recognition of meaning -- is set up. Mathematics, even in its higher branches, when undue emphasis is put upon the technique of calculation, and science, when laboratory exercises are given for their own sake, suffer from the same evil.

On the intellectual side, the separation of "mind" from direct occupation with things throws emphasis on things at the expense of relations or connections. It is altogether too common to separate perceptions and even ideas from judgments. The latter are thought to come after the former in order to compare them. It is alleged that the mind perceives things apart from relations; that it forms ideas of them in isolation from their connections -- with what goes before and comes after. Then judgment or thought is called upon to combine the separated items of "knowledge" so that their resemblance or causal connection shall be brought out. As matter of fact, every perception and every idea is a sense of the bearings, use, and cause, of a thing. We do not really know a chair or have an idea of it by inventoring and enumerating its various isolated qualities, but only by bringing these qualities into connection with
something else -- the purpose which makes it a chair and not a table; or its difference from the kind of chair we are accustomed to, or the "period" which it represents, and so on. A wagon is not perceived when all its parts are summed up; it is the characteristic connection of the parts which makes it a wagon.

And these connections are not those of mere physical juxtaposition; they involve connection with the animals that draw it, the things that are carried on it, and so on. Judgment is employed in the perception; otherwise the perception is mere sensory excitation or else a recognition of the result of a prior judgment, as in the case of familiar objects.

Words, the counters for ideals, are, however, easily taken for ideas. And in just the degree in which mental activity is separated from active concern with the world, from doing something and connecting the doing with what is undergone, words, symbols, come to take the place of ideas. The substitution is the more subtle because some meaning is recognized. But we are very easily trained to be content with a minimum of meaning, and to fail to note how restricted is our perception of the relations which confer significance. We get so thoroughly used to a kind of pseudo-idea, a half perception, that we are not aware how half-dead our mental action is, and how much keener and more extensive our observations and ideas would be if we formed them under conditions of a vital experience which required us to use judgment: to hunt for the connections of the thing dealt with.

There is no difference of opinion as to the theory of the matter. All authorities agree that discernment of relationships is the genuinely intellectual matter; hence, the educative matter. The failure arises in supposing that relationships can become perceptible without experience -- without that conjoint trying and undergoing of which we have spoken. It is assumed that "mind" can grasp them if it will only give attention, and that this attention may be given at will irrespective of the situation. Hence the deluge of half-observations, of verbal ideas, and unassimilated "knowledge" which afflicts the world. An ounce of experience is better than a ton of theory simply because it is only in experience that any theory has vital and verifiable significance. An experience, a very humble experience, is capable of generating and carrying any amount of theory (or intellectual content), but a theory apart from an experience cannot be definitely grasped even as theory. It tends to
become a mere verbal formula, a set of catchwords used to render thinking, or genuine theorizing, unnecessary and impossible. Because of our education we use words, thinking they are ideas, to dispose of questions, the disposal being in reality simply such an obscuring of perception as prevents us from seeing any longer the difficulty. (7)

Dewey uses the meaning of the word ‘evil’, then, to refer to, with semiotic understanding, the lack of transaction of meaning in association with the body and mind transmission of data through the senses of humans, i.e. in association with the mind and body natural urges to move and to have experiences, in regard to educology, i.e. in regard to knowledge about educative experiences. In this regard and with this understanding, philosophically speaking, then, knowledge about the educative experience exists, the meaning of which refers those with the knowledge, i.e. refers educologists, to the question of how to organize the educational institutions of a democracy, i.e. home, school, business, government, churches, etc. for the people, i.e. children, youth, and adults, to have educative experiences, i.e. have experiences understood and oriented by transacted meaning rather than not understood and oriented by transacted meaning.

A semiotically understood and oriented experiential philosophy of educology as a democratic philosophy of life directs educologists living in the democracy of the USA, as well as in democracies of other countries in the world, to attend to what Dewey refers to by the meaning of the words ‘Either-Or’ in his book *Experience and Education*.

Though *Experience and Education* was written in 1938, it is still applicable to the developing democracy of the USA and developing democracies of the world, today. In Chapter 1 entitled “Traditional vs. Progressive Education,” Dewey says:
Mankind likes to think in terms of extreme opposites. It is given to formulating its beliefs in terms of Either-Ors, between which it recognizes no intermediate possibilities. When forced to recognize that the extremes cannot be acted upon, it is still inclined to hold that they are all right in theory but that when it comes to practical matters circumstances compel us to compromise. Educational philosophy is no exception. The history of educational theory is marked by opposition between the idea that education is development from within and that it is formation from without; that it is based upon natural endowments and that education is a process of overcoming natural inclination and substituting in its place habits acquired under external pressure. (8)

Again, though writing in 1938, what Dewey has to say is relevant today, when he says:

At present, the opposition, so far as practical affairs of the school are concerned, tends to take the form of a contrast between traditional and progressive education. (9)

What Dewey is pointing at is that which was occurring throughout the middle and late 1900s in the developing democracy of the USA, i.e. the reform of education as conducted in schools through either-or forms of thinking such that either the traditional education is taken as the right one or the progressive education is taken as the right one, without considering that the either-or forms of thinking, rather than orienting reformers toward the right form of thinking about education, ought to rather;

. . . set new problems which have to be worked out on the basis of a new philosophy of experience. (10)

Remembering that the reflective thinking experience, as guided transacted meaning, is what Dewey means by an educative experience and remembering that it is the meaning guided transactions in reflective thinking experience that provides the organic connection between education and experience, it is worthwhile considering the distinction between what he refers to by the meanings of the words
‘educative experience’, and ‘mis-educative experience’, when he says:

The belief that all genuine education comes about through experience does not mean that all experiences are genuinely or equally educative. Experience and education cannot be directly equated to each other. For some experiences are mis-educative. An experience is mis-educative that has the effect of arresting or distorting the growth of further experience. (11)

Mis-educative experiences, then, are non-reflectively conducted experiences, i.e. experiences in which thinking is not being conducted with transacted meaning intellectualized by it penetrating and impregnating the psychical mental feelings of emotions, mental images of imagination, and mental will of volition, nor the habits of disposition, i.e. the psychical sensations of mind, and, hence, not affecting the physical sensations of the body in a coordinated, continuing, and growing mind-body active experience.

When characterizing mis-educative experiences, Dewey says:

An experience may be such as to engender callousness; it may produce lack of sensitivity and of responsiveness. Then the possibilities of having richer experience in the future are restricted. Again, a given experience may increase a person’s automatic skill in a particular direction and yet tend to land him in a groove or rut; the effect again is to narrow the field of further experience. An experience may be immediately enjoyable and yet promote the formation of a slack and careless attitude; this attitude then operates to modify the quality of subsequent experiences so as to prevent a person from getting out of them what they have to give. Again, experiences may be so disconnected from one another that, while each is agreeable or even exciting in itself, they are not linked cumulatively to one another. Energy is then dissipated and a person becomes scatterbrained. Each experience may be lively, vivid, and ‘interesting,’ and yet their disconnectedness may artificially generate dispersive, disintegrated, centrifugal habits. The consequence of formation of such habits is inability to control future
experiences. They are then taken, either by way of enjoyment or of discontent and revolt, just as they come. Under such circumstances, it is idle to talk of self-control. (12)

In regard to the either-or thinking used by those taking the side of traditional education and those taking the side of progressive education, Dewey states:

Traditional education offers a plethora of examples of experiences of the kinds just mentioned. It is a great mistake to suppose, even tacitly, that the traditional schoolroom was not a place in which pupils had experiences. Yet this is tacitly assumed when progressive education as a plan of learning by experience is placed in sharp opposition to the old. The proper line of attack is that the experiences which were had, by pupils and teachers alike, were largely of a wrong kind. How many students, for example, were rendered callous to ideas, and how many lost the impetus to learn because of the way in which learning was experienced by them? How many acquired special skills by means of automatic drill so that their power of judgment and capacity to act intelligently in new situations was limited? How many came to associate the learning process with ennui and boredom? How many found what they did learn so foreign to the situations of life outside the school as to give them no power of control over the latter? How many came to associate books with dull drudgery, so that they were ‘conditioned’ to all but flashy reading matter? (13)

Dewey hastens to say about traditional education, however, that:

If I ask these questions, it is not for the sake of wholesale condemnation of the old education. It is for quite another purpose. It is to emphasize the fact, first, that young people in traditional schools do have experiences; and, secondly, that the trouble is not the absence of experiences, but their defective and wrong character — wrong and defective from the standpoint of connection with further experience. (14)

And, further he says, in regard to progressive education and the problem it sets for the practicing educologist, or, using Dewey’s words, the problem it sets for the educator.

The positive side of this point is even more important in connection with progressive education. It is not enough to insist upon the necessity of experience, nor even of activity in experience.
Everything depends upon the quality of the experience which is had. The quality of any experience has two aspects. There is an immediate aspect of agreeableness or disagreeableness, and there is its influence upon later experiences. The first is obvious and easy to judge. The effect of an experience is not borne on its face. It sets a problem to the educator. It is his business to arrange for the kind of experiences which, while they do not repel the student, but rather engage his activities are, nevertheless, more than immediately enjoyable since they promote having desirable future experiences. Just as no man lives or dies to himself, so no experience lives and dies to itself. Wholly independent of desire or intent, every experience lives on in further experiences. Hence the central problem of an education based upon experience is to select the kind of present experiences that live fruitfully and creatively in subsequent experiences. (15)

The Central Problem of a Semiotically Understood and Oriented Experiential Philosophy of Educology as a Democratic Philosophy of Life

The central problem, as rephrased in the context of a semiotical understanding and orientation of experiential philosophy of educology as a democratic philosophy of life, then, is one that faces theoretical educologists in consideration of practicing educologists, specifically teachers. It is:

how can a practicing educologist identify for selection of, i.e. how can a practicing educologist know, that kind of experience that is educative in that it will live fruitfully and creatively in subsequent experiences when meaning is transacted within a reflective thinking experience involving the transmission of the data information, i.e. within the reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning of experience, and which increases ability to direct the course of subsequent experience?
Using (1) the meanings of the words ‘facts’ and ‘information’, as the meaning of the words ‘data of information’, (2) the meaning of the word ‘idea’ to refer to the (i) stimulus-response association of mental feelings, images, and will as (ii) penetrated and impregnated by transacted meaning; (3) the meaning of the words ‘scientific method’ to refer to the reflective thinking experience; (4) the meaning of the word ‘educator’ to refer to a practicing educologist; and (5) the meaning of the word ‘intelligence’ to refer to the intellectualization of the transacted meaning of an idea, the following quote from Dewey is highly relevant to an important condition requiring “a long view forward” facing theoretical educologists trying to solve the central problem for practicing educologists.

About this condition, Dewey talks about the need for a long view forward, by saying:

. . . experiences in order to be educative must lead out into an expanding world of subject-matter, a subject matter of facts or information and of ideas. This condition is satisfied only as the educator views teaching and learning as a continuous process of reconstruction of experience. This condition in turn can be satisfied only as the educator has a long look ahead and views every present experience as a moving force in influencing what future experiences will be. (16)

Further, Dewey explains the emphasis he is placing on the scientific method, as the phases of the reflective thinking experience, when he says:

I am aware that the emphasis I have placed upon scientific method may be misleading, for it may result only in calling up the special technique of laboratory research as that is conducted by specialists. But the meaning of the emphasis placed upon scientific method has little to do with specialized techniques. It means that scientific method is the only authentic means at our command for getting at the significance of our everyday experiences of the world in which we live. It means that scientific method provides a working pattern of the way in which and the conditions under which experiences are used to lead ever onward and outward. Adaptation
of the method to individuals of various degrees of maturity is a problem for the educator, and the constant factors in the problem are the formation of ideas, acting upon ideas, observation of the conditions which result, and organization of facts and ideas for future use. Neither the ideas, nor the activities, nor the observations, nor the organization are the same for a person six years old as they are for one twelve or eighteen years old, to say nothing of the adult scientists. But at every level there is an expanding development of experience, if experience is educative in effect. Consequently, whatever the level of experience, we have no choice but either to operate in accord with the pattern it provides or else to neglect the place of intelligence in the development and control of a living and moving experience.” (17)

In this quote, Dewey alludes to the general phases, i.e. the general pattern, in the reflective thinking experience, i.e. in the scientific method, when saying, as paraphrased, that the constant factors in the scientific method are: (1) a felt problem; (2) the formation of ideas of how to solve the problem; (2) acting upon ideas; (3) observation of the conditions which result; and (4) organization of acts and ideas for future use.

A corollary problem to the central problem for theoretical educologists in consideration of practicing educologists, then, is that of more fully explicating the phases of the reflective thinking experience, i.e. the pattern of the scientific method, so as to understand its logic as, in Dewey’s terms, “a theory of inquiry,” from the perspective of a semiotical understanding of the semiosical process in which it is embedded.

This corollary problem is being worked on by Educology Research Associates/USA (ERA/USA), in a philosophical project working on: (1) the reference of the meaning of the words “logic of eduction,” i.e. the logic of how transacted meaning is used to draw out the phases of the reflective thinking experience, i.e. to draw out the
pattern of the scientific method in use in everyday life; and (2) the significance of this reference to the central problem.

The philosophy of educology being followed at ERA/USA is that of the semiotic understanding of the semiosically oriented organic connection between education and experience, through the transaction of meaning, and between this connection and the arrangements for a democratic way of life as it affects the quality of human daily experience. It follows Dewey, when he makes a distinction between the meanings of the words ‘cause’ and ‘reasons’ in reference to why democracy is the preferable arrangement for a way of life:

The question I would raise concerns why we prefer democratic and humane arrangements to those which are autocratic and harsh. And by ‘why,’ I mean the reason for preferring them, not just the causes which lead us to the preference. One cause may be that we have been taught not only in the schools but by the press, the pulpit, the platform, and our laws and law-making bodies that democracy is the best of all social institutions. We have so assimilated this idea from our surrounds that it has become an habitual part of our mental and moral make-up. But similar causes have led other persons in different surroundings to widely varying conclusions — to prefer facism, for example. The cause for our preference is not the same thing as the reason why we should prefer it.” (18)

In regard to the reasons, Dewey says:

It is not my purpose here to go in detail into the reason. But I would ask a single question: Can we find any reason that does not ultimately come down to the belief that democratic social arrangements promote a better quality of human experience, one which is more widely accessible and enjoyed, than do non-democratic and anti-democratic forms of social life? Does not the principle of regard for individual freedom and for decency and kindliness of human relations come back in the end to the conviction that these things are tributary to a higher quality of experience on the part of a greater number than are methods of repression and coercion or force? Is it not the reason for our preference that we believe that mutual consultation and convictions
reached through persuasion, make possible a better quality of experience than can otherwise be provided on any wide scale? (19)

At ERA/USA, from the perspective of a semiotically oriented experiential philosophy of educology, the answer to this question is in the affirmative. And, the affirmative answer to this question is recommended to all educologists, theoretical or practicing, who are working in and for democracies in the world.

Part II Summary

In Part II, a semiotically understood and oriented experiential philosophy of educology as a democratic philosophy of life was sketched. The sketch includes the meaning of the word ‘education’ to reference the reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning of experience, and which increases ability to direct the course of subsequent experiences, also referred to by the meaning of the words ‘educative experience’ and ‘reflective thinking experience’.

With this meaning of the word ‘education’, then, philosophy of educology becomes the philosophy of knowledge about educative experiences or reflective thinking experiences. And, with this meaning of education, then, it was stated that the end of education is more education, i.e. the end of educative experiences as reflective thinking experiences is more of the same. More generally, the educative experience is the human growth experience the aim of which is more human growth experiences. Educology, then, becomes knowledge about human growth experiences, as conducted through the reflective thinking experience.

The purpose of schools and other institutions in which education is conducted, then, is to provide the arrangement that insures the continuance of education by organizing the
powers that insure human growth experiences, i.e: (1) the experience of the sensation of physical data organically involved in the stimulus-response transmission of data associations in the nervous system of human bodies; (2) the experience of the sensation of psychical data organically involved in the stimulus-response transmission of data type of associations in the reflective thinking phases of human minds; and (3) the experience of intellectualization of the semiosical meaning organically involved in the standing for transaction of meaning type of associations in the reflective thinking phases of human minds.

Part II concludes with: (1) statements of the central and corollary problems facing theoretical educologists in consideration of practicing educologists in democracies in the world, i.e. the problems of (i) how to know kinds of experiences that are educative as involved in the reflective thinking experience and (ii) the explication of the phases of reflective thinking; and (2) reasons why democracy is the preferable arrangement for a way of life guided by the growth aimed educative experience of the reflective thinking experience, which is in short, because it provides best for human growth.

Conclusion

Philosophy of educology is philosophy of knowledge about education and a general sketch of a semiotically understood and oriented organic experiential philosophy of educology has been presented for consideration by educologists in democracies in the world.

The sketch provides the beginning of the work at understanding, i.e. at coming to know; (1) how transacted meaning, as a semiosical existent and transmitted data, as physical and psychical existents, are associated in the
eductive experience of the reflective thinking experience and (2) the problem that educologists must solve in arranging for this educative experience in democracies in the world, for the growth of their people.

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